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I. INTRODUCTION
Our attorneys advised us that the law firm that lost the case was demanding the
wineries pay them $456,000. In return, they would agree not to file an appeal. This
threat to our time and money didn't come in a clever disguise; it was blackmail in
its most basic form.
Martha Culbertson ran a small winery in Southern California 2 Along
with industry giants, she was named in a class action suit because the
lawyer bringing the suit wanted a particular venue for trial.' The com-
plaint alleged that the lead foil used in packaging the wine posed a
health risk to consumers." Because wine connoisseurs generally do not
consume the labels and packaging, the defendants prevailed at trial.'
Nonetheless, the attorney who brought the suit threatened to file an
appeal unless he received a settlement.'
1. Martha Culbertson, Grapes of Wratk Frivolous Lawsuits Can Sink a Small





6. Id. Section 128.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure has allowed courts
to impose sanctions on parties who pursue frivolous claims. See CAL Civ. PROC. CODE
§ 128.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995); see also infra notes 207-13 and accompanying
text. Recent legislation preserves § 128.5 for "a complaint filed, or a proceeding initi-
ated, on or before December 31, 1994." 1994 Cal. Stat. 1062 § 1 (A.B. 3594); CAL CIV.
PROC. CODE § 128.5(b)(1). Otherwise, the California Legislature has suspended § 128.5
"until January 1, 1999, substituting in its place, for a four-year trial period, a statute
modeled on recently revised Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
Crowley v. Katleman, 881 P.2d 1083, 1096 n.13 (Cal. 1994) (en banc); see Kane v.
Hurley, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 809, 811-12 (Ct. App. 1994) (acknowledging the legislative
changes); CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7 (West Supp. 1995) (providing a statewide
Rule 11 analogue for four years); 1994 Cal. Stat. 1062; see also CAL CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 446 (West 1973 § Supp. 1995) (requiring verification for complaints filed by public
entities).
On January 1, 1988, the judicial council shall provide a report to the Legisla-
ture that details the number of sanctions motions filed, the types of cases
Attorneys who make a living bringing meritless class action suits may
be responsible for a large and lucrative number of frivolous lawsuits.7
Further, the American rule' has given rise to a culture of litigation by
and the frequency to which those cases are subjected to a sanctions motion,
the numbers of pleadings, motions, or similar papers withdrawn or corrected
within the 30-day period for withdrawal or correction, the numbers of sanc-
tions motions granted or denied, and the forms of sanctions imposed when
sanctions are assessed.
1994 Cal. Stat. 1062 § 7 (A.B. 3594).
Although § 128.5 was operative at time of the Culbertson case and California
has a number of fee-shifting statutes, none of these statutes prevented the abuse
cited in the text. See CAL. CIrV. PROC. CODE § 128.5; infra notes 214-28 and accompa-
nying text; see also, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1995) (requiring fee
shifting in actions for misappropriation of another's likeness).
7. See generally In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1983),
rev'd on other grounds, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984). In re Fine Paper involved a
class action suit against paper companies. See generally id. Although the suit was
settled before trial, it generated a number of lawsuits concerning the distribution of
the proceeds. Id. at 190-91. These cases are representative of attorney self-dealing.
See generally id. at 68-80 (describing the background of the lawsuit). In the initial
suit to apportion attorney fees, squabbling among the attorneys gave rise to allega-
tions that the attorneys overstaffed the case to run up attorneys' fees, "to fatten the
lodestar determination." In re Fine Paper, 751 F.2d at 572. The district court refused
the attorneys' request for legal fees entailing approximately 4096 of the settlement
fund. In re Fine Paper, 98 F.R.D. at 68. The court pointed out that the various law
firms' petitions for fees were "grossly excessive on their face and, regrettably, lend
substance to the widely-held and mostly unfavorable impressions of the plaintiffs'
class action bar, sometimes referred to as the class action industry." Id. See generally
John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Eco-
nomic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Ac-
tions, 86 COLUM. L REV. 669 (1986) (analyzing incentives that cause attorneys to file
claims that are unlikely to succeed); Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to
Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Re-
view, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1971) (stating that class actions, designed to induce set-
tlements, are "legalized blackmail"); Francis R. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litiga-
tion-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199 (1976) (stating that class
actions undermine the judicial process); Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail
and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma,
47 S. CAL. L. REv. 842 (1974) (discussing consumer class actions); Arthur R. Miller,
Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action
Problem," 92 HARV. L REv. 664 (1979) (noting that class actions burden the courts);
William Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375
(1972) (suggesting that the detriment to society outweighs any benefit class actions
might have).
8. The American rule provides that each party must bear the cost of his
attorney's fees unless there is a statutory, contractual or judicial exception. See gen-
erally Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (affirming
the American rule and discussing the exceptions).
In 1796, the Supreme Court endorsed the American rule, a judicially created doc-
trine. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796). Since there are many articles
discussing the history and development of the American rule in detail, that back-
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encouraging individuals, sometimes misguided, sometimes bringing pa-
tently false claims, to sue.' In fact, the cynical view is that it is every
American's right to legally harass anyone he chooses.'" According to
some commentators, freedom of access to the courts is the primary rea-
son for social progress and the development of important civil rights."
While there is some truth to that position, there must be a clear standard
for sanctioning invalid claims for courts to function efficiently and fairly.
Although colorable claims should be welcome in court, courts and legis-
latures must do more to discourage abuse of the legal system. Indeed,
there is a current political movement to apply the English nile'2 to legal
fees in American courts. 3
II. OVERVIEW: PROBLEMS WITH THE AMERICAN RULE AND
A MODERATE SOLUTION
Our system is too costly, too painful, too destructive, and too inefficient for a
truly civilized people."
The American rule regarding payment of legal fees has been a source
of controversy for many years.'5 Yet, the current concerns about the
ground will not be presented here. See, e.g., John F. Vargo, The American Rule on
Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV.
1567, 1570-78 (1993); see also John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American
Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs., Winter 1984, at 9-11.
Some aspects of the history are presented infra notes at 257-60, 322 and accompany-
ing text.
9. See generally Peter Carlson, Legal Damages, WASH. POST, March 15, 1992 (Mag-
azine), at 10 (giving examples and providing statistics of meritless suits).
10. See generally id. (discussing public perceptions).
11. E.g., Eric K Yaramoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts
for Minorities, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341, 421-29 (1990).
12. The English rule, in its most basic form, provides that the prevailing party in a
lawsuit may recover all costs, including attorney fees, from the losing party. See
Vargo, supra note 8, at 1569-71.
13. See Common Sense Legal Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 101(a) (1995) (issued to the public Sept. 27, 1994).
14. Edwin Chen, Burger Assails Legal System as 'Too Destructive', LA. TMES,
Feb. 13, 1984, at 1 (quoting Chief Justice Warren E. Burger in a Feb. 12, 1984 speech
to the American Bar Association), reprinted in THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: A SERIES
OF ARTICLES REPRINTED FROM THE LOS ANGELES TamEs 43 (1984) [hereinafter THE LITI-
GATION ExPLosION].
15. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 270 (1975). For a
list of articles arguing against a strict application of the American rule, see id. at 270
n.45, and Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4 n.4 (1973).
litigation explosion" highlight its flaws. The American rule provides no
deterrent to groundless litigation.'7 In fact, it invites spurious claims.
While the American rule remains the general rule in federal and state
courts,'" it has undergone some modification in recent years.2" Propo-
nents of the American rule resist these changes, claiming that the rule
ensures open access to courts.2' This view holds that the English rule
16. "Litigation explosion" refers to the modem increase in filing lawsuits and using
lawsuits to remedy problems that parties traditionally resolved by other means. See
Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Conundrum, 26 GA. L REv. 901, 904-05 (1992) (providing
background information). See generally WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION:
WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991) (arguing in favor of
the English rule); Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, The State of Justice, 70 A.B.A. J.,
Apr. 1984, at 62, 65 (expressing concern that discovery has perpetuated groundless
suits and has become a "tool of extortion"); Philip Hager & Michael A. Hiltzik, A//
Parties Abet a Legal Tidal Wave, LA. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1984, at 1, available in THE
LITIGATION EXPLOSION, supra note 14, at 1-5 (citing examples and statistics). For a list
of articles from 1972-1983 covering this subject, see John W. Wade, On Frivolous
Litigation: A Study of Tort Liability and Procedural Sanctions, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV.
433, 435 n.5 (1986).
Some commentators do not feel that "increased litigation" is a problem in light
of "expanded expectations of justice." See, e.g., Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing
Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARv. L REv. 630, 631 (1987).
17. See generally PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITvENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUS-
TICE REFORM IN AMERICA (1991) (recommending a "loser pays" system) [hereinafter
AGENDA]; OLSON, supra note 16, at 247-70 (arguing that the American rule encourages
litigation); John M. Johnson & G. Edward Cassady I, Frivolous Lawsuits and Defen-
sive Responses to Them-What Relief Is Available?, 36 ALA. L. REv. 927 (1985) (as-
serting that new ways to deal with frivolous litigation should be considered); William
C. Campbell, Note, Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A
Historical Analysis, 88 YALE LJ. 1218 (1979) (arguing that malicious prosecution
should be brought as a counterclaim rather than a separate action); John R Jones,
Jr., Note, Liability for Proceeding with Unfounded Litigation, 33 VAND. L REV. 743
(1980) (proposing a model statute to deter unfounded claims); David Masci, Tort Plan
Limits Liability, Aims at Frivolous Suits, CONG. Q., Nov. 19, 1994, at 3345 (discuss-
ing the Republican proposal, "Contract with America").
18. E.g., Neal H. Elausner, The Dynamics of Rule 11: Preventing Frivolous Liti-
gation by Demanding Professional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L REv. 300, 305-06
(1986).
19. See, e.g., Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 270.
20. A number of statutes impact the American rule. See infra notes 58-111, 164-228
and accompanying text. In 1983 the legislature amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See infra note 40 and accompanying text. Congress has enacted a
number of statutes that provide for one-way fee shifting in favor of prevailing plain-
tiffs. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 & Supp. V 1994) (enacted originally as the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fee Act of 1976). Most states have legislation addressing frivolous
lawsuits. See infra notes 169-75 and accompanying text. In addition, there are judicial
exceptions to the common law. See infra notes 112-35, 159-63 and accompanying
text. Discussions of Rule 11 often include discussions of the relative merits of the
American and English rules because fee shifting was a frequent sanction under the
1983 Rule 11. See infta note 81 and accompanying text.
21. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973) (noting that "an additional
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chills lawsuits that espouse novel legal theories and promote the growth
of the common law.' Further, the American system protects important
civil and consumer rights.' On the other hand, proponents of the Eng-
lish rule point out the deleterious effect of the American rule on the legal
system.' The courts are overburdened, and the economy suffers when
business is subject to a form of legal extortion-settle or pay the legal
costs of discovery and trial.25 Although it is generally accepted that the
English rule would deter vexatious lawsuits,' it is unclear whether there
would be fewer lawsuits filed if it were the norm in America.'
Even though the American rule may encourage the filing of claims that
have no basis in law or fact,' some legitimate claims may still remain
motivation for the American rule was a desire to minimize imbalance in the adver-
sary system"); Johnson & Cassady, supra note 17, at 927-31 (asserting that "any at-
tempt to devise a system for responding to spurious actions is, by its very nature, in
conflict with the value placed on free access to courts in American society"); Donna
Marino, Rule 11 and Public Interest Litigation: The Trend Toward Limiting Access
to the Federal Courts, 44 RUTGERS L REV. 923, 928 (1992) (explaining that Rule 11
"may effectively negate the right to seek redress of injuries in courts").
22. See Georgene M. Vairo, The 1993 Amendments to Rule 11, in 1 ALI.-A.B.A.
RESOURCE MATERIALS: CIVIL PRACTICE AND LITIGATION IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS,
§ C-1, 8 (1994), available with minor changes in WESTLAW, ALI-ABA database,
Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Past and Future, C915 ALI-ABA 157, 168; Eric K
Yaramoto & Danielle K Hart, Rule 11 and State Courts: Panacea or Pandora's Box?,
13 U. HAW. L REV. 57, 101 (1991) (discussing consequences of Rule 11).
23. See generally Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are
Going, 60 FORDHAM L REV. 475 (1991) (discussing concerns about Rule 11 sanctions).
24. See generally AGENDA, supra note 17 (proposing reforms and stating the rea-
sons for them); OLSON, supra note 16 (providing examples of unwarranted suits and
discussing the need for reform).
25. See generally AGENDA, supra note 17 (discussing abuses of the current system);
OLSON, supra note 16 (providing examples of bad faith litigation).
26. See, e.g., Susan R. Bogart, Recent Decision, 65 TEMP. L REV. 959, 959 (1992)
(stating that the purpose of fee shifting is to deter claims). But see Keith N. Hylton,
Fee Shifting and Incentives to Comply with the Law, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1069, 1097
(1993) (asserting that, although facially an unreasonable theory, proplaintiff one-way
fee shifting "generatels] the least litigation").
27. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L Rubinfeld, Sanctioning Privolous Suits:
An Economic Analysis, 82 GEo. UJ. 397, 422-23 (1993) (arguing that the English rule
is not a strong deterrent to frivolous claims); Jeffrey A Parness, Choices About Attor-
ney Fee Shifting Laws: Further SubstancelProcedure Problems Under Erie and Else-
where, 49 U. Prrr. L REV. 393, 394 (1988) (stating that fee-shifting statutes promote
the filing of valid claims).
28. See generally OLSON, supra note 16 (citing many examples); Johnson &
Cassady, supra note 17 (claiming increased costs would deter unfounded suits);
Jones, supra note 17 (stating that groundless suits are a byproduct of a policy of
unredressed when the cost to litigate exceeds the possible recovery.'
This rule encourages debtors to avoid paying their debts.' In fact, the
rationale behind the creation of the American rule may have been to
discourage those with minor claims from bringing suit?' Conversely, the
English rule encourages the filing of small, meritorious claims because it
ensures that the injured party is made whole by the awarding of attorney
fees.' This does not necessarily result in more lawsuits, however, since
the injured party's likelihood of success in court provides incentive for
the wrongdoer to settle and avoid paying both sides' lawyers' fees.' Al-
though institutionalizing the English rule might reduce the burden on
courts, simple justice may be the most persuasive rationale for providing
some form of fee shifting in American courts.
Although not a principal point of discussion in cases or commentary,'
open access to courts); Campbell, supra note 17 (asserting that malicious prosecution
does not deter vexatious lawsuits). For examples of meritless claims, see the 12 "civil
rights" cases filed by Brenda Pusch in Pusch v. Social Sec. Admin., 811 F. Supp. 383
(C.D. Ill. 1993), including a suit against a newspaper for failing to publicize that she
was a member of the Holy Trinity and had been crucified, and United States ex re.
Mayo v. Satan & His Staff, 54 F.RD. 282 (W.D. Pa 1971).
29. See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Soci-
ety, 54 CAL L. REv. 792, 792 (1966) (relating personal experience that lawyer fees
discouraged the filing of a legitimate claim); M. Isabel Medina, Comment, Award of
Attorney Fees in Bad Faith Breaches of Contract in Louisiana--An Argument
Against the American Rule, 61 TUL. L REv. 1173, 1182-83 (1987) (arguing that the
American rule does not provide justice for small claimants).
30. Arthur A. Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Col-
lection, 80 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1970) (noting that debtors are aware, that the cost of
bringing suit may exceed their debt, so "[uInder the American law of contracts, after
the other party has fully performed his obligations it is absolutely irrational for you
to perform yours"); see also OLSON, supra note 16, at 329 ("The imbalance creates a
field day for the chisler or defaulter.").
31. OISON, supra note 16, at 330-31.
32. Parness, supra note 27, at 394; e.g., Polinsky & Rubinfeld, supra note 27, at
423-25.
33. See Philip J. Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-examination of the Indemnity
System, 55 IOWA L REv. 26, 34 (1969); Parness, supra note 27, at 394. But see RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 53742 (3d ed. 1986) (asserting that the
English rule induces fewer settlements than the American rule); John J. Donohue Ill,
Opting for the British Rule, or If Posner and Shavell Can't Remember the Coase
Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARv. L REv. 1093, 1094 (1991) (stating that the American
and English rules induce the same number of settlements).
34. The emphasis has been on open access to the courts for plaintiffs. Talamini v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1070-71 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Freedom of
access to the courts is a cherished value in our democratic society."); Alyeska Pipe-
line Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 262 (1975) (stating that the purpose
of the American rule is to encourage parties to litigate). Equitable considerations
focus on compensating a prevailing plaintiff for bringing his suit. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (providing a fee-shifting statute for civil rights actions).
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fairness to a reluctant litigant is a simple concept that has "intuitive"
public appeal.' It seems fair that a plaintiff who victimizes another with
a meritless lawsuit should pay for all legal costs of the prevailing defen-
dant. Yet, legal costs are often a modest remedy, since they alone will
not repay the defendant for the emotional and social costs of the law-
suit.' Similarly, it seems fair that a defendant who refuses to pay a le-
gitimate claim should have to pay the plaintiffs legal costs. Nonetheless,
implementation of the English rule would not be fair in cases where the
merits of the case do not clearly favor one party. 7
The American rule is entrenched in the American legal system,' but
federal and state statutes attempt to mitigate its negative effects.' For
example, Congress amended Rule 11 in 1983 to discourage unreasonable
pleadings, motions and claims. ' In response to criticisms that the Rule
It is evidently considered sufficient justice under the American rule if a plaintiff or
defendant prevails. Fairness to the losing party is the primary concern. See
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (noting
that "since litigation is at best uncertain one should not be penalized for merely
defending or prosecuting a lawsuit").
35. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Criti-
cal Overview, 1982 DuKE L.J. 651, 657-58 (1982).
36. See POSNER, supra note 33, at 537 (recognizing that, even under the English
rule, "indemnity is never complete, because . . . time and bother ... are not com-
pensated").
Some commentators view the modem proliferation of lawsuits as a symptom of
a greater social problem, the breakdown of supportive institutions, coupled with a
desire to blame others for personal misfortune. See Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a
Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982) (asserting that people are turning to courts
to take the place of church and family); see also Scott S. Partridge et al., A Com-
plaint Based on Rumors: Countering Frivolous Litigation, 31 LOy. L REV. 221, 227
(1985) (arguing that an increase in litigation may have social roots); Kacy Sackett,
Lauyers Grumble Under the Weight of Repeat Plaintiffs, LA. DAmY J., Mar. 11, 1988,
at 1 (claiming that multiple litigants "often [work] out their psychological problems at
the court's expense").
37. Professors Polinsky & Rubinfeld determined through economic analysis that the
English rule alone does not provide a sufficient deterrent to frivolous lawsuits. See
generally Polinsky & Rubinfeld, supra note 27 (providing mathematical analysis). They
recommend a penalty in addition to the defendant's counsel fees in order to deter
meritless claims. See id. at 425. If this analysis is correct and compensation, not
punishment, is the goal, concerns that the English rule would chill legitimate and
socially beneficial claims are unwarranted.
38. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 270.
39. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
40. See Amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 196-97
(1983). The 1983 amendment to Rule 11 required the signature of an attorney of
discouraged novel claims, Congress again amended the Rule in 1993,"
lessening its effectiveness in sanctioning lawyers and litigants."' Yet, re-
visions of Rule 11 have not alleviated concerns about the effects of the
American rule. In fact, recent proposals by elected officials address the
need for civil justice reform in the federal courts.' A current proposal
record. The 1983 amendment read in pertinent part
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer
that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper, that to the
best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reason-
able inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to ha-
rass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litiga-
tion. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken
unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of
the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an ap-
propriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or
parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing
of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 121 F.R.D. 101, 105-06 (1988) (amended 1993).
41. The language of the new Rule weakens a court's ability to sanction parties.
The "shall" language has become "may," and the court's power to impose sanctions
on its own motion is restricted. See FED. R CIV. P. 11(c). A court is now limited to
"enter[ing] an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate [the re-
quirements of Rule 11 that the filings have a proper purpose] and directing an attor-
ney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated [Rule 11 standards]
with respect thereto." See FED. R CIV. P. 11(c)(1)(B). The Rule limits sanctions "to
what is sufficient to deter comparable conduct by others similarly situated." See FED.
R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). Further, "monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's
initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal
or settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attor-
neys are, to be sanctioned." FED. R. CIv. P. 11(c)(2)(B). Rule 11 also now provides
for a "safe harbor": a Rule 11 motion must be separately filed, and the accused party
has 21 days to withdraw or correct the challenged document and avoid sanctions.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 11(c)(1)(A).
The 1993 amendment strengthened Rule 11 by imposing a continuing duty to
withdraw papers when it becomes clear that they are not legally or factually support-
able. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Further, courts may sanction law firms, not only individ-
ual attorneys, under the new rule. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(1)(A). In addition, the lan-
guage of the revised Rule 11 may allow sanctions for oral representations or conduct
Cynthia A. Leiferman, The 1993 Rule 11 Amendments: The Transformation of the
Venomous Viper into the Toothless Tiger?, 29 TORT & INS. U. 497, 498 (1994); see
FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
42. See Leiferman, supra note 41, at 498.
43. See Common Sense Legal Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 101(a) (1995) (issued to the public Sept. 27, 1994); AGENDA, supra note 17. Both
the Agenda and the Common Sense Legal Reform Act apply solely to federal diversity
cases. Cf. generally Carl Tobias, Executive Branch Civil Justice Rform, 42 AM. U. L.
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would substantially reinstate the pre-1993 Rule 11 and create a "loser
pays" system for diversity actions.' Some states attempt to mitigate the
effect of the American rule through statutes, which provide valuable
comparisons. Alaska has a complex system that approximates the Eng-
lish system;' however, it has been the subject of criticism and reform in
recent years.4M To a greater extent than many other states, Texas and
California courts practice limited two-way fee shifting, awarding attorney
fees to the prevailing party only in certain actions.47 While some com-
mentators feel that discrete statutes do not provide a satisfactory solu-
tion,'M delineating specific actions subject to fee shifting suggests a suit-
able compromise. A workable solution combines the best of the English
and the American rules49 and provides the basis of a uniform model for
all the states. Although a strict "loser pays" proposal may be too ex-
treme,' legislatures nationwide should enact some modification of the
English rule.
Current statutory and common law approaches to mitigating the nega-
tive effects of the American rule are not sufficient to achieve justice or
REv. 1521 (1993) (discussing civil justice reform efforts pertaining to the executive
branch).
44. See Common Sense Legal Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 101(a) (1995) (issued to the public Sept 27, 1994).
45. Unless there is an agreement between the parties, Alaska Rule 82 awards
attorney's fees to the prevailing party according to the amount recovered. ALASKA Civ.
R 82 (1994). The court retains some discretion in awarding attorney's fees, however,
and the rule provides factors to consider, including the reasonableness of the
attorney's fees. ALASKA CIrv. R. 82(b)(3) (1994). If the court does use its discretion, it
must explain its reasoning. Id. For a discussion of Rule 82, see ifra notes 181-94
and accompanying text.
46. See ALASKA Civ. R. 82 (1994) (giving dates that Rule 82 was amended, repealed
and reenacted); Kevin M. Kordziel, Note, Rule 82 Revisited: Attorney Fee Shifting in
Alaska, 10 ALASKA L REV. 429 (1993) (discussing the concern that the rule deters
claims).
47. See infra notes 195-228 and accompanying text.
48. See generally Gregory E. Maggs & Michael D. Weiss, Progress on Attorney's
Fees: Expanding the "Loser Pays" Rule in Texas, 30 Hous. L REV. 1915 (1994) (rec-
onmnending fee shifting to the prevailing party and citing the Alaskan system as a
model).
49. The American rule's value is that it provides unfettered access to courts. See
supra notes 11, 21 and accompanying text. The English rule discourages spurious
lawsuits. See infra notes 230-55 and accompanying text. The proposal suggested in
this Comment would discourage some groundless filings without discouraging worthy
challenges to current law. See inf'ra notes 280-300 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 21-23; infra notes 264-74 and accompanying text.
to relieve the burden on courts. This Comment discusses the American
rule in light of modem concerns and the effectiveness of existing modifi-
cations. Part III explores fee-shifting devices in the federal system, in-
cluding Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the inherent power of the
courts.5 The discussion in Part IV encompasses traditional common law
solutions and representative state statutes dealing with frivolous suits.'
Part V examines the policy reasons for two-way fee shifting, taking into
consideration the dual aspects of fee shifting, compensation and deter-
rence.' Finally, this Comment concludes that allowing reimbursement
of attorney's fees to the prevailing party when the judge awards summa-
ry judgment or grants dismissal' in state actions is fair and does not
chill civil rights claims.' This compromise between the American and
English rules provides a bright-line test for awarding counsel fees and ac-
crues to the benefit of both courts and litigants.'
III. FEDERAL COURTS
If you're going to maintain respect for our system of justice, it's important to es-
tablish some limited standards of responsibility, to say there is no room for decep-
tion in the courtroom, or for baseless claims.7
A. Rule 11 as a Deterrent to Meritless Claims
Before the 1993 amendments went into effect, Rule 11 was a powerful
tool against meritless claims.' A claim that was dismissed under Rule
12(b),' Rule 12(c) ° or Rule 41" could be the subject of a Rule 11 ac-
51. See infra notes 58-135 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 137-228 and accompanying text.
53. See irfra notes 230-74 and accompanying text.
54. In this context, dismissal refers to involuntary dismissal or dismissal for a vari-
ety of procedural reasons. See infra notes 280-87 and accompanying text.
55. See AGENDA, supra note 17, at 24.
56. See iqfra notes 275-314 and accompanying text.
57. Tamar Lewin, A Legal Curb Raises Hackles, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 2, 1986, at Dl,
D8 (quoting Judge William W. Schwarzer).
58. See JOHN J. COUND ET AL, CvIL PROCEDURE 586-87 (6th ed. 1993); William W.
Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARv. L REv. 1013, 1015 (1988); Lawyers' Respon-
sibilities to the Courts: The 1993 Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11, 107 HARv. L REV. 1629, 1636 (1994) [hereinafter Lawyers' Responsibilities to the
Courts]; Lewin, supra note 57, at D8 (quoting Professor Arthur Miller, one of the
formulators of the 1983 amendments to Rule 11, as to Rule l's effectiveness in curb-
ing groundless suits). See generally Melissa L Nelken, The Impact of Federal Rule 11
on Lawyers and Judges in the Northern District of California, 74 JUDICATURE 147
(1990) (analyzing the results of a survey about Rule 11 effectiveness).
59. Rule 12(b) deals with motions to dismiss for lack of personal or subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficiency of process or service of process, failure
to state a claim, or failure to join a party. FED. R CIV. P. 12(b).
60. Rule 12(c) concerns motions for a judgment on the pleadings. FED. R. Cirv. P.
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tion that continued long after the court dismissed the sanctionable
claim. 2 Much of the criticism of the pre-1993 Rule 11 focused on the
claim that it spawned "satellite litigation"' and discouraged the volun-
tary dismissal of claims.' Other concerns were that Rule 11 itself had
become a tactic to frustrate opponents,' that it was used most frequent-
ly against plaintiffs,' that judges used the Rule in a discriminatory fash-
12(c). A 12(c) motion may be treated as a motion for summary judgment. See id.
61. Rule 41 involves voluntary and involuntary dismissals. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41.
Generally, voluntary dismissals are dismissed without prejudice; involuntary dismissals
function as "an adjudication upon the merits." Id.
62. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 56 (1991) ("Even under Rule 11,
sanctions may be imposed years after a judgment on the merits."); Collier v. Mar-
shall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, 977 F.2d 93, 95 (3d Cir. 1992) (imposing
sanctions on attorney pursuant to a motion to dismiss a civil rights claim); Willy v.
Coastal Corp., 915 F.2d 965, 968 (5th Cir. 1990) (upholding Rule 11 sanctions
awarded after a 12(b)(6) motion was granted), affd, 503 U.S. 131 (1992); Ring v. R.J.
Reynolds Indus., 597 F. Supp. 1277, 1279 (N.D. Il. 1984) (imposing sanctions on
plaintiff, age 39, for bringing an age-discrimination suit against employer), affd, 804
F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1986); WSB Elec. Co. v. Rank & File Comm. to Stop 2-Gate Sys.,
103 F.R.D. 417, 418 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (imposing sanctions on plaintiff after dismissal of
claims). But cf. Jones v. Slater Steels Corp., 660 F. Supp. 1570, 1577 (N.D. Ind. 1987)
(stating that facts support summary judgment, but not sanctions, although the deci-
sion was "dangerously close").
63. See Marino, supra note 21, at 931; Vairo, surra note 22, § C-1, at 4-6, avail-
able in WESTLAW, C915 ALI-ABA 157, 164-66. Professor Vairo noted that, because a
defendant could have invoked the 1983 version of Rule 11 after a plaintiff voluntarily
dismissed an action, Rule 11 increased derivative litigation. Vairo, supra note 23, at
486. Satellite litigation refers to litigation brought to test the scope of the Rule. See
William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look,
104 F.R.D. 181, 183 (1985) (noting that satellite litigation involves "ancillary proceed-
ings that may themselves assume the dimensions of litigation with a life of [their]
own").
64. See Marino, supra note 21, at 944-45; Vairo, supra note 22, § C-1, at 17-18,
available in WESTLAW, C915 ALI-ABA 157, 183. But see Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 385 (1990) ("If a litigant could purge his violation of Rule 11
merely by taking a dismissal, he would lose all incentive to [consider the validity of
a claim before filing].").
65. Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 484-85 (3d Cir. 1987) ("The use of Rule
11 as an additional tactic of intimidation and harassment has become part of the so-
called 'hardball' litigation techniques."); Interim Report of the Committee on Civility
of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 371, 409; see CoUND Er AL, supra
note 58, at 587.
66. Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 77
IOWA L REv. 1775, 1775 (1992); Vairo, supra note 22, § C-1, at 2-5, available in
WESTLAW, C915 AU-ABA 157, 163-64; Russ Herman, Rule 11 is Prejudicial to Plain-
tiff, NAT'L LJ., July 24, 1989, at 17. But see THOMAs E. WILLGING, THE RuLE 11 SANc-
ion,67 and that the Rule had a "chilling effect" on novel legal theories
and civil rights clailms.'
In a recent article, Professor Vairo pointed out that lawmakers institut-
ed the 1983 version of Rule 11 to counter judicial reluctance to impose
sanctions on attomeys.Y The legislature adopted the objective standard
to ensure an evenhanded application of the Rule. Furthermore, the
1983 Rule 11 effectively discouraged the filing of groundless claims.'
While Professor Vairo believes that Rule 11 never should have been the
main tool to counter meritless claims, she admits that there is "insuffi-
cient evidence" that judges used Rule 11 disproportionately in civil rights
cases or that the Rule has had a "chilling effect" on lawsuits in general. 2
TIONING PROCEss 75 (1988) (concluding that, "although plaintiffs were more likely than
defendants to be targeted for sanctions, they were less likely to have sanctions im-
posed").
67. Marino, supra note 21, at 983 ("Because the rule is prone to misuse, it has
proven a dangerous tool in the hands of a judge whose personal and political opin-
ions may not match those of the litigant before the court."); Tobias, supra note 66,
at 1775.
68. In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 524-25 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 969
(1991); Leiferman, supra note 41, at 497; Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amend-
ed Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensa-
tion and Punishment, 74 GEO. LJ. 1313, 1314 (1986); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil
Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485, 488, 525 (1989) (claiming that Rule 11 has
"chilled the enthusiasm" of "civil rights litigants and lawyers"); Varo, supra note 22,
§ C-1, at 2-5, available in WESTLAW, C915 ALI-ABA 157, 163-64. But see STEPHEN B.
BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 69 (1989) (noting that results of survey indi-
cate only a slightly higher number of requests for sanctions imposed on civil rights
plaintiffs); WILLGING, supra note 66, at 2 (claiming that "little evidence was found
that sanctions have a chilling effect on creative advocacy or unpopular causes");
William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L REv. 1013, 1017 (1988) ("My
own experience has disclosed no anecdotal evidence of chilling.").
69. Vairo, supra note 22, § C-1, at 5, available in WESTLAW, C915 AU-ABA 157,
165; see D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Strik-
ing" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L REv. 1, 34-37
(1976) (discussing the infrequency of Rule 11 sanctions before the 1983 amendment);
see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. at
575 (1988), and in 121 F.R.D. 101, 106 (1988) (explaining that the reason for amend-
ing Rule 11 in 1983 was to encourage courts to use sanctions) [hereinafter Advisory
Committee Notes].
70. Vairo, supra note 22, § C-1, at 5, available in WESTLAW, C915 All-ABA 157,
165.
71. See id. at 11, available in WESTLAW, C915 ALI-ABA 157, 170-71.
72. Id. at 7, available in WESTLAW, C915 ALI-ABA 157, 167; see Elizabeth C.
Wiggins et al., The Federal Judicial Center's Study of Rule 11, 2 FJC DIRECTIONS 21-
23 (Nov. 1991) (claiming that civil rights claims are not sanctioned disproportionately
when plaintiffs are represented); see also BURBANK, supra note 68, at 69 (noting that
requests for sanctions were only slightly more frequent "than one would expect on
the basis of civil filings in this circuit"); WILLGING, supra note 66, at 2 ("Little evi-
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Indeed, many frivolous actions are "framed as civil rights actions...
[which] trivialize[s] important issues."m
The new Rule 11 is weaker than the 1983 amended version,74 in part
because it no longer requires mandatory sanctions."6 Further, the judge
may no longer impose monetary sanctions without a motion from one of
the parties or without first entering an order requiring a litigant to show
cause that he has not violated the Rule." Moreover, litigants are not
likely to seek sanctions under the new Rule because monetary sanctions
are generally payable to court rather than to the prevailing party.77 The
irony of this change is that, in effect, a court may be unable to sanction
abuses of Rule 11 itself.' The new Rule also provides a "safe harbor
provision," a twenty-one day grace period in which a party can voluntari-
ly withdraw a claim and not be subject to sanctions.' Because of this
dence was found that sanctions have a chilling effect on creative advocacy or unpop-
ular causes.").
73. Sackett, supra note 36, at 1 (quoting Warren Kinsler, general counsel for Los
Angeles Community College District).
74. See Leiferman, supra note 41, at 501-06.
75. See id; Vairo, supra note 22, § C-I, at 14-16, available in WESTLAW, C915
ALI-ABA 157, 182; see also Litigators, Academics Discuss Impact of Amendments to
Federal Rules, 8 No. 3 INSIDE LITG. 9, 14-15 (1994) [hereinafter Litigators, Academics
Discuss Impact].
76. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c). For an excerpt of the text, see supra note 41. For addi-
tional discussion about this aspect of the 1993 amendment, see Vairo, supra note 22,
§ C-I, at 14-16, available in WESTLAW, C915 ALI-ABA 157, 182; Litigators, Academ-
ics Discuss Impact, supra note 75, at 13.
77. Amendments .to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 507, 508-09
(1993) (dissenting statement of Scalia, J.); see FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2); Vairo, supra
note 22, § C-i, at 14-16, available in WESTLAW, C915 ALI-ABA 157, 182 (stating that
"Rule 11 movants have no right to a sanctions award"); see also Leiferman, supra
note 41, at 501-02 (discussing the elimination of mandatory sanctions); Litigators,
Academics Discuss Impact, supra note 75, at 13 (discussing the new Rule's provi-
sions).
78. See FED. R. CIv. P. 11(c). Since Rule 11 is discretionary, the court would sim-
ply deny a Rule 11 motion. Although it is possible a court might impose sanctions
for wrongly invoking Rule 11, it is extremely unlikely that any court would bother to
do so in the ordinary case. When imposing any sanctions, a court must now "de-
scribe the conduct" and "explain the basis for the sanction imposed." FED. R. CIv. P.
11(c)(3). In 1987 the Third Circuit warned, "A court may impose sanctions on its
own initiative when the Rule is invoked for an improper purpose." Gaiardo v. Ethyl
Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 485 (3d Cir. 1987). This threat is no longer significant in light of
the changes in the Rule.
79. FED. R. CIv. P. 11(c)(1)(A). For excerpts from and explanations of the current
Rule 11, see supra note 41.
waiting period, the new Rule 11 discourages motions for sanctions in
conjunction with motions to dismiss.8 Further, whereas fee shifting was
the primary sanction under the pre-1994 version of the Rule,"' the new
version is "designed to eliminate sanctions as a form of cost-shifting" and
is "likely to undermine seriously the deterrent effect of the rule."' Con-
sequently, many authorities on Rule 11 view it as "functionally dead." '
Even before its revision in December 1993, Rule 11 was not a panacea
for frivolous lawsuits in federal courts. Courts did not routinely award
monetary sanctions for blatantly groundless claims.5' The Rule ad-
dressed claims that lacked substantial justification, but not those that
could not be proved. ' Because Rule 11 in any form has not been a com-
pletely effective deterrent ' to meritless suits, proponents of the English
rule have maintained their efforts to establish civil justice reforms. 7 The
80. See Vairo, supra note 22, § C-1, at 17-20, 24-26, available in WESTLAW, C915
ALI-ABA 157, 173-74, 189-91; see also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
81. See Schwarzer, supra note 58, at 1018-20; Vairo, supra note 22, § C-I, at 4,
available in WESTLAW, C915 ALI-ABA 157, 164.
82. Leiferman, supra note 41, at 504-05.
83. See Litigators, Academics Discuss Impact, supra note 75, at 15 (stating that
Gregory P. Joseph, a noted Rule 11 scholar, believes that Rule 11 motions will now
be the "exception rather than the rule").
84. See generally Pease v. Pakhoed Corp., 980 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1993) (denying a
motion to sanction plaintiff who filed a general, scandalous complaint and refused to
comply with an order for a more definite statement). In some cases, plaintiffs bring a
number of lawsuits before injunctions are issued against them. See Mallon v. Padova,
810 F. Supp. 642, 643 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Pusch v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 811 F. Supp. 383,
385 (C.D. Il1. 1993); see also Jane Fritsch, The Man Wo Sued Too Much, NEWSDAY
MAGAZINE, Feb. 1, 1987, at 10 (reporting that nationwide injunction was imposed .on
law school graduate after years of bringing frivolous lawsuits). In the most egregious
cases, the plaintiffs filed complaints pro se. See Mailon, 810 F. Supp. at 643; Pusch,
811 F. Supp. at 385. See generally Fritsch, supra (describing various suits the plaintiff
initiated). These patently unfounded suits might not have been before the court and
the injunctions would not have been necessary if courts had routinely assessed attor-
ney fees on dismissal.
Courts most frequently impose Rule 11 sanctions in tax cases. See, e.g., Lemaster
v. United States, 891 F.2d 115, 122 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding Rule 11 sanctions for
frivolous suit against the Internal Revenue Service); see also Lewin, supra note 57, at
Dl.
85. Martin B. Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation: A Golden
Anniversary View of Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 N.C. L REV. 1023, 1062 (1989).
86. A primary objective in amending the pre-1983 statute was to deter frivolous
suits. See Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 69, at 575, reprinted in 121 F.R.D.
at 107.
87. See generally AGENDA, supra note 17 (listing proposed reforms). The
President's Council on Competitiveness also recommended strengthening Rule 11 by
requiring a continuing duty and by applying it to all' lawyers involved in the case. Id
at 25. The Council also suggested that the Rule be applied more uniformly, which, in
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current "Contract with America" proposal includes reinstating the court's
ability to sanction parties on its own motion, as well as reinstating the
mandatory sanction requirement of the prior Rule.'
Although the earlier Rule provided both deterrence and compensation,
the current Rule 11 does little to deter unfounded claims.' Further, the
new version usually will not allow significant fee shifting to compensate
defendants in unmeritorious lawsuits.' In addition, commentators have
criticized Rule 11 for its flexibility and the courts for not providing clear
guidelines for its use.9
Courts need a bright-line test that works in concert with other devic-
es' to deter vexatious claims. Unlike Rule 11, such a test must not ap-
ply to federal actions. It would then pose no threat to civil rights claims.
B. 28 U.S.C. § 1927
Any attorney... who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs,
expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct'
The initial version of this statute was rarely used and was not uniform-
this context means, presumably, more often. See id. The 1993 amendment incorpo-
rates the first two recommendations. See FED. R Civ. P. 11; supra notes 43-44 and
accompanying text.
88. See Common Sense Legal Reform Act of 1995, H.R 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 104(b) (1995) (issued to the public Sept. 27, 1994).
89. See generally Litigators, Academics Discuss Impact, supra note 75, at 13-16
(discussing the ramifications of the 1993 amendment).
90. See Lawyers' Responsibilities to the Courts, supra note 58, at 1632-34.
91. E.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Sanctions, Symmetry, and Safe Harbors: Limiting
Misapplication of Rule 11 by Harmonizing It with Pre-Verdict Dismissal Devices, 60
FORDHAM L REV. 257, 261 (1991) (advocating a presumption that a pre-trial dismissal
precludes application of Rule 11).
92. An important statute that is beyond the scope of this Comment is Federal Rule
68, which provides incentive to settle before trial by penalizing a party who refuses
to accept a reasonable offer. See FED. R. Civ. P. 68. Under Rule 68, if the plaintiff
rejects an offer made at least 10 days before trial and the offered settlement is more
favorable than the judgment, the plaintiff is liable for the defendant's costs from the
time the defendant made the offer. Id. Rule 68 may also impact a prevailing
plaintiffs ability to collect attorney fees when a statute provides for fee shifting. See
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985) (holding that "where the underlying statute
defines 'costs' to include attorney's fees," the fees are recoverable under Rule 68).
Many states have enacted similar "offer of judgment" statutes. See, e.g., WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.84.280 (West 1988); see also id. §§ 4.84.260, 484.270 (West 1988).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
ly applied. Originally, § 1927 did not specify counsel fees as a possible
sanction under the statute. 6 Before Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,6
some districts awarded attorney's fees and others did not.17 In Roadway
Express, however, the Supreme Court ruled that courts could not award
attorney fees under § 1927." Congress immediately responded by
amending § 1927 to explicitly allow fee shifting, with courts retaining the
right to use other sanctions.' After the amendment in 1980, § 1927 had
potential as a deterrent against groundless claims, although the sanction
remained discretionary."° Yet, courts still infrequently use it.'0 '
Because § 1927 only allows sanctions against attorneys,"° its reach is
narrow. Nonetheless, in some respects it has a broader application than
other remedies. For example, it imposes a continuing duty on attor-
neys, " and a voluntary dismissal does not prevent the court from im-
posing sanctions under the statute. ' Yet, although Congress intended
to permit sanctions for a wide variety of meritless claims," courts have
limited the statute's use by requiring a subjective finding of bad faith."n
Under this restraint, applying sanctions under § 1927 requires the same
finding of bad faith as required under the court's inherent powers."
Therefore, § 1927 is a superfluous, not a powerful, tool. Section 1927
could have independent significance, however, if used to sanction a law-
yer when his client voluntarily dismisses a frivolous lawsuit."n
94. Johnson & Cassady, supra note 17, at 956; Jones, supra note 17, at 767-68
(discussing discrepancy among circuits).
95. Johnson & Cassady, supra note 17, at 956.
96. 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
97. Johnson & Cassady, supra note 17, at 956; Jones, supra note 17, at 767-68
(discussing discrepancy among circuits).
98. Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 757-61.
99. Johnson & Cassady, supra note 17, at 956-57; Wade, supra note 16, at 472-74;
see 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
100. See Wade, supra note 16, at 472-73.
101. See Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 192
(1988).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
103. See Wade, supra note 16, at 472-73 (noting cases that apply § 1927 to different
aspects of the proceedings); Lawyers' Responsibilities to the Courts, supra note 58,
at 1636 n.54.
104. Bolivar v. Pocklington, 975 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that district
courts retain jurisdiction to impose sanctions after voluntary dismissal).
105. See H.R CONF. REP. No. 1234, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5-7 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2781-83; Johnson & Cassady, supra note 17, at 956.
106. See Wade, supra note 16, at 472-73. Professor Wade pointed out that § 1927
could apply to any actions that multiply the proceedings unreasonably, as well as to
filing a groundless suit. Id. He interprets this as creating an objective test. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Litigators, Academics Discuss Impact, supra note 75, at 16. Since recent
amendments have weakened Rule 11, § 1927 may be used to impose sanctions when
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28 U.S.C. § 1927 has limited value as a deterrent or as a means of com-
pensating a prevailing party since it only applies to lawyers"n and
courts have interpreted the statute narrowly. " ' Furthermore, because
courts rarely use it,"' there must be other methods to dissuade unrea-
sonable litigants.
C. The Inherent Power of the Court
In addition to statutory measures, federal courts may exercise common
law exceptions to the American rule."2 When a party exercises bad
faith or deliberately defies a court order, he may have to pay the oppos-
ing party's attorneys' fees."3 Under the common benefit or common
fund exception,"4 the court may award attorney fees when the "litiga-
a case has been voluntarily dismissed. Id. at 13-14. Professor Vairo predicts it will be
unusual for a party to prevail on a motion to dismiss and to recover attorney fees
under Rule 11. Id. at 13, 16. According to Professor Vairo, under the 1993 amend-
ment, "courts are quite clearly supposed to be shifting towards non-monetary sanc-
tions and fines" and people are "not to think that Rule 11 is compensatory." Id. at
16. In an egregious case, § 1927 may be the sole remedy for "vexatious multiplication
of the proceeding." Id.
109. When considering a suit's merit and whether to impose sanctions, courts may
have different standards for lawyers and litigants. Compare CAL CIr. PROC. CODE
§ 391 (West 1973 & Supp. 1995) (a "vexatious litigant" is, inter alia, he who repre-
sents himself and who has filed more than five suits within seven years that are
determined to be final and adverse to him) with MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 3.1 cmt. 2 (1994). The American Bar Association's Model Rules provide:
The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not
frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or
because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery. Such
action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's posi-
tion ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the client
desires to have the action taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or
maliciously injuring a person or if the lawyer is unable either to make a
good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the
action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or re-
versal of existing law.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 cmt. 2 (1994).
110. See Wade, supra note 16, at 472-73.
111. See Vairo, supra note 101, at 192.
112. See generally Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (discussing the
courts' inherent power).
113. Id. at 45-46.
114. This doctrine has many names. In addition to the common benefit or common
fund doctrine, it is also known as the equitable fund doctrine. See itfra note 130
tion efforts directly benefit others.""5 In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 116
the Supreme Court endorsed the application of these inherent powers in
concert with statutory sanctions."7
The bad faith exception is a subjective test with limited use."8 Sub-
jective bad faith can be difficult to prove, and courts historically have
been reluctant to award attorney fees on this basis."9 Furthermore, al-
though the court in Chambers broadly applied the bad faith excep-
tion, '2 it emphasized that fee shifting is an extraordinary measure.'
and accompanying text. Further, the theory is similar to the substantial benefit doc-
trine which allows recovery of attorney fees for nonpecuniary benefits. See Vargo,
supra note 8, at 1579-83. Courts have not always distinguished between the two doc-
trines. See id. at 1581-82.
115. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45 (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-58 (1975)).
116. 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
117. Id. at 46. Since statutes may reach "only certain individuals or conduct, the in-
herent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses. At the very least, the in-
herent power must continue to exist to fill in the interstices." Id. Some commenta-
tors have criticized this manifestly sensible decision as an example of judicial over-
reaching. See Leading Case, Courts' Inherent Authority to Sanction in Diversity Cas-
es: Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 105 HARV. L REv. 349 (1991) [hereinafter Courts' Inher-
ent Authority]. Yet, Rule 11 could not address all the misconduct in Chambers. See
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 35-42. The majority was correct to use its inherent power to
sanction the whole of Chambers' misbehavior since this did not contravene Rule 11.
Id. The purpose of Rule 11 clearly was to discourage unreasonable litigation practic-
es. See Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 69, at 575, reprinted in 121 F.R.D. at
106.
The facts of the case support a finding of bad faith. Chambers breached a con-
tract to sell a television station. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 35-36. He then engaged in a
number of unethical maneuvers to avoid specific performance, blatantly disobeying an
injunction against transferring the station. Id. at 36-39. The court warned Chambers
that his actions were unethical; however, he continued to frustrate the proceedings.
Id. at 38. Although the dissent and some commentators claim otherwise, the trial
court did not impose the sanction substantively for bad faith breach of conduct. See
id. at 58-60 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 60-77 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Courts' In-
herent Authority, supra, at 358. The court sanctioned Chambers for his outrageous
conduct after the breach and for his defiance of court orders. See Chambers, 501
U.S. at 35-42.
118. See Aiyeska, 421 U.S. at 258-59.
119. See, e.g., Medina supra note 29, at 1187-88; cf Advisory Committee Notes,
supra note 69, at 575, reprinted in 121 F.R.D. at 106 ("The new language is intended
to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions.").
120. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50-52.
121. Id. "A court must, of course, exercise caution in involdng its inherent power,
and it must comply with the mandates of due 'process . . . ." Id. at 50. The Roadway
Express Court is often cited to support this. Id. at 50, 59 (Scalla, J., dissenting).
"Like other sanctions, attorney's fees certainly should not be assessed lightly or
without fair notice and an opportunity for a fair hearing on the record." Roadway
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980).
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As with Rule 11, the court may employ a variety of sanctions and is not
obligated to award attorney fees."a
The purpose of fee shifting under the bad faith exception is puni-
tive.In Thus, the remedy is too uncertain to be a reliable deterrent to
frivolous litigation."4 Furthermore, courts have accepted the idea that
the "mere fact that an action is without merit does not amount to bad
faith."" The courts' avowed reluctance to exercise its inherent power
and judicial freedom to choose sanctions weigh against fee shifting to
the prevailing party. Even when exercised, the courts' inherent power
may not compensate an injured party.
The common fund exception developed as a restitutionary remedy'
26
for a prevailing plaintiff who "confer[red] substantial benefits on the
members of an ascertainable class of beneficiaries. " " This exception
developed so that beneficiaries of the lawsuit share in the cost of the
attorney's fees."a Those who benefit may not be parties to the lawsuit,
but it is possible that they would have a relationship to it." Although
the benefit to the target class may be fictional, this exception provides
the rationale for fee shifting in shareholder derivative suits."n Yet,
122. See, e.g., Chambers, 501 U.S. at 58-60 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 53-54 (quoting Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973)).
124. Sanctions under the court's inherent power are uncertain because punitive
damages are, by nature, a speculative remedy. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and
Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L REV. 1, 33-63 (1982); Mi-
chael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort
Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IoWA L. REV. 1, 42 (1992); Malcolm E. Wheeler,
The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L REV.
269, 310-11 (1983). Compensatory damages, on the other hand, must be measurable.
See ELAINE W. SHOBEN & W. MURRAY TABB, REMEDIES 552 (1989); Rustad, supra, at
42. Nonetheless, sanctioning under this power is an important part of the entire pack-
age of sanctioning devices. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46. Although it may be difficult to
prove bad faith, this remedy is less onerous than bringing an action for malicious
prosecution or abuse of process. Johnson & Cassady, supra note 17, at 968.
125. Miracle Mile Assocs. v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing
Runyan v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 183-84 (1976)).
126. E.g., Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing
the Problem, 1986 DUKE L.J. 435, 440 (1986).
127. Hall, 412 U.S. at 15.
128. Dobbs, supra note 126, at 440.
129. See, e.g., id. at 441 (discussing shareholder derivative suits).
130. See Hall, 412 U.S. at 5-7; Dobbs, supra note 126, at 441. In Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, the Court rejected the private attorney general
exception to the American rule, but upheld the common fund exception. 421 U.S.
240, 264-71 (1975). The difference between the two theories of recovery is that, under
courts did not develop the common fund theory to shift fees to prevail-
ing parties, and in the usual case, it may not do so."'
These common law exceptions to the American rule provide little de-
terrent to frivolous litigation." Although the courts designed the bad
faith exception to deter extreme abuse, the common fund exception
never served that purpose." The courts designed the common benefit
theory solely to compensate a prevailing party."3 While the common
fund exception may be a compensatory device, it is not necessarily a fee-
shifting one, and people other than the losing party may indemnify the
successful litigant." Thus, the common fund doctrine rarely deters vex-
atious litigants, and only in rare instances does the bad faith exception
compensate a prevailing party. Therefore, both the bad faith and the
common fund doctrines have limited use.
the private attorney general theory, the general public supposedly benefits from the
action. Id. at 264-67. Conversely, the class of beneficiaries under the common fund
exception is presumed to be "small in number and easily identifiable." Id. at 264-65
n.39; see F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex ret. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116,
129-30 (1974) (distinguishing between the two theories). Further, under the common
fund theory, the losing party may not have to pay the attorney fees. Vargo, supra
note 8, at 1579-83. In any case, the court must have control of the common fund to
implement fee shifting under this theory. Id. at 1581.
The common benefit doctrine, also known as the equitable fund doctrine, is sus-
ceptible to abuse by class action lawyers. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98
F.R.D. 48, 67 (E.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984).
Class action lawyers who run up large fees generally do not have altruistic motives.
See Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1090-91 (3d Cir.) (stating that
lawyer, who was the class representative, hired his law firm to pursue the suit), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976). "Critics point particularly to over-generous application of
the equitable fund doctrine, by means of which massive fees are awarded attorneys
with too little regard for the interests of the class members." In re Fine Paper, 98
F.R.D. at 67 (citing City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir.
1977)).
131. See, e.g., Dobbs, supra note 126, at 440-41.
132. See, e.g., id. at 440-44.
133. See Wade, supra note 16, at 470.
134. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 52-54 (1991). Under both the bad
faith and common fund exception, courts award attorney's fees only to prevailing par-
ties. See Hall, 412 U.S. at 5.
135. See Rowe, supra note 35, at 662.
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IV. STATE SOLUTIONS TO UNJUSTIFIABLE LITIGATION
Groundless civil litigation is, however, more than an affliction visited upon a few
scattered individuals; it besets the judicial system as a whole. It is, therefore,
appropriate to think of it as a systemic problem and to fashion a remedy which
preserves and strengthens the integrity of the civil litigation system rather than
randomly providing a fortuitous amount of compensation in a handful of isolated
cases.'1'
A. Common Law Solutions
Malicious prosecution and abuse of process are tort remedies for
abuse of legal procedure. Additionally, state courts may offer relief to
injured parties by exercising inherent powers.
1. Malicious Civil Prosecution
Malicious civil prosecution is the traditional common law remedy for
filing frivolous lawsuits.'37 The tort generally requires that a party be a
prevailing defendant in a civil lawsuit." The prior lawsuit first must be
concluded, and the vindicated party then must bring a separate suit."n
A few states, however, allow the defendant in the original suit to bring a
counterclaim for malicious prosecution." Additionally, a plaintiff in a
subsequent suit must prove malice and absence of probable cause to
bring the initial action. 4 The malice element requires a subjective stan-
dard,42 which is a heavy burden for a plaintiff to prove." Since the
tort requires a separate action and the elements may be difficult to
prove, there is little incentive for injured parties to use malicious prose-
cution to vindicate their rights.'" Further, in approximately one-third of
136. Friedman v. Dozorc, 312 N.W.2d 585, 608 (Mich. 1981) (Levin, J., concurring).
137. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
ToRS § 120, at 889-96 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the background and application of
wrongful civil proceedings).
138. E.g., id. § 120, at 892.
139. E.g., id.
140. Id. § 120, at 892-93; Campbell, supra note 17, at 1233 n.107.
141. E.g., KEETON ET AL, supra note 137, § 120, at 893-95.
142. See id. § 120, at 894-95. Malice "may consist of a primary motive of ill will, or
a lack of belief in any possible success" or an improper purpose in bringing the ac-
tion. Id. § 120, at 895. For example, in California, malice is "a wish to vex, annoy or
injure." CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL (BAJI) No. 7.34 (8th ed. 1994).
143. E.g., KEETON ET AL, supra note 137, § 120, at 896.
144. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 17, at 1232.
American jurisdictions, special damages are a separate element of the
tort."4 Because special damages do not include attorney fees incurred
in the wrongful suit, attorney fees are not recoverable in a subsequent
lawsuit."
Since malicious prosecution requires bringing another lawsuit after the
wrongful action terminates, the tort is neither an effective deterrent to
frivolous litigation nor an adequate means of compensating a wronged
party.'47 Further, malicious prosecution compromises judicial efficiency,
since bringing an additional action increases the burden on the
courts."s Therefore, of all the alternatives for an injured party, this rem-
edy is the most unsatisfying.'49
2. Abuse of Process
Unlike malicious prosecution, abuse of process does not require that
the proceedings at issue be concluded."u To prevail under this tort, a
party must prove an ulterior purpose and a deliberate and improper use
of process.'5' The second element is subjective, although motive may be
inferred from the act.'52
While abuse of process may be easier to prove than malicious prosecu-
tion," both are difficult to establish."M Further, a party cannot bring
an abuse of process action to counter a vexatious lawsuit" because
145. WiLAm L PROSSER ET AL, CASES AND MATERIAIS ON TORTS 1009 (9th ed. 1994).
146. E.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 137, § 120, at 889. The rationale for this re-
quirement is to encourage good faith litigants to file suits without fear of a later
action. Id.
147. E.g., Jones, supra note 17, at 753.
148. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 17, at 1232.
149. See KEETON ET AL, supra note 137, § 120, at 896. But cf. Amwest Mortgage
Corp. v. Grady, 925 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1991). After Amwest voluntarily dismissed
Grand Capital Mortgage Co. as a defendant in an action for fraud, Grand Capital
moved for Rule 11 sanctions. Id. at 1163. The court denied the motion, and Grand
Capital then sued for malicious prosecution. Id. When Amwest requested that the
court issue an injunction to enoin Grand Capital's suit, the court refused to do so.
Id. Because a lack of probable cause was not the basis of the decision to deny the
Rule 11 motion, the issue had never been "fully and fairly litigated." Id. at 1165.
Further, "[t]he scope of a Rule 11 hearing is much narrower than a full civil proceed-
ing in state court." Id. While malicious prosecution is not a complete remedy, it
serves a purpose, particularly with the weakening of Federal Rule 11. See id.
150. E.g., KEETON ET AL, supra note 137, § 121, at 897.
151. E.g., id. § 121, at 898.
152. E.g., id. § 121, at 899.
153. See Wade, supra note 16, at 451.
154. E.g., Partridge et al., supra note 36, at 250.
155. PROSSER Er AL, supra note 145, at 1012.
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abuse of process addresses discrete acts incidental to the lawsuit."
Some commentators believe, however, that abuse of process can lie
where a defendant brings a counterclaim to delay the plaintiffs recovery
in the original action.5 At best, abuse of process, like malicious prose-
cution, provides an uncertain remedy to frivolous litigation. Most often, it
would not be an appropriate answer to warrantless suits. Indeed, "[t]he
roadblocks to malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims are, in
most cases, nearly impossible to overcome. " "
3. Inherent Power
The inherent power of courts to shift fees provides only a limited ex-
ception to the American rule.'" The majority of states that have consid-
ered the issue in the judicial forum recognize this inherent power."°
156. See KEETON ET AL, supra note 137, § 121, at 897-99.
157. Johnson & Cassady, supra note 17, at 941.
158. Grace 'A. Carter, New Limits on Malicious Prosecution: Remedies for
Frivolous Lawsuits and Abusive Legal Tactics, LA. LAWYER, Sept 1989, at 23, 28.
159. See supra notes 112-35 and accompanying text.
160. Many, if not most, states recognize the court's inherent power to shift fees in
extreme cases. See, e.g., Larkin v. State ex rel. Rottas, 857 P.2d 1271, 1281 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1992); Price v. Price, 780 S.W.2d 342, 345 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989); Fattibene v.
Kealey, 558 A.2d 677, 684 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989); Miller v. Miller, 586 So. 2d 1315,
1317 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1991) (Sharp, J., dissenting in part); Wong v. Frank, 833
P.2d 85, 91-92 (Haw. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 834 P.2d 1315 (Haw. 1992); Sander v.
Dow Chem. Co., 624 N.E.2d 1255, 1265 (MI1. App. Ct.), appeal allowed, 624 N.E.2d 817
(Ill. 1993); In re Estate of Kroslack, 570 N.E.2d 117, 121 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Lake
Village Water Ass'n v. Sorrell, 815 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991); Optic Graph-
ics, Inc. v. Agee, 591 A.2d 578, 587-88 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (quoting Needle v. White,
568 A.2d 856, 861 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 573 A.2d 1338 (Md. 1990)), cert.
denied, 598 A.2d 465 (Md. 1991); Selleck v. S.F. Cockrell Trucking, Inc., 517 So. 2d
558, 560 (Miss. 1987); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 382 N.W.2d 2,
8 (Neb. 1986) (quoting Holt County Coop. Ass'n v. Corlde's, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 312, 315
(Neb. 1983)); Harkeem v. Adams, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (N.H. 1977); State ex rel. High-
way and Transp. Dept. v. Baca, 867 P.2d 421, 422-23 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993), offd in
part & rev'd in part, 1995 WL 322764 (N.M. 1995); City of Gahanna v. Eastgate
Properties, Inc., 521 N.E.2d 814, 816-17 (Ohio 1988); Robinson v. Kirbie, 793 P.2d 315,
319 (Okla. C. App. 1990); Deras v. Myers, 535 P.2d 541, 550 (Or. 1975) (en banc);
Truk Away of R.L, Inc. v. Macera Bros. of Cranston, 643 A.2d 811, 817 (R.I. 1994);
Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994); Van Eps v.
Johnston, 553 A.2d 1089, 1091 (Vt. 1988); Wilson v. Henkle, 724 P.2d 1069, 1076-77
(Wash. Ct. App. 1986); Daily Gazette Co. v. Canady, 332 S.E.2d 262, 264 (W. Va.
1985); Schaefer v. Northern Assurance Co., 513 N.W.2d 615, 617, 621 (Wis. Ct. App.
1994).
Some states interpret the common fund theory broadly, so that courts
may award attorney fees to "a party who has prevailed in an action that
benefits many other litigants," 8' including defendants in the case."n
Other states reject fee shifting as being contrary to the American rule
and do not allow it when courts exercise their inherent power."
B. Statutory Solutions
In recent years, some state legislatures have fashioned statutes based
on Federal Rule 11. In addition, many states have a general statute deal-
ing with meritless claims. Other state legislation allows for fee shifting in
very specific cases.
1. Rule 11 in State Courts
Several states have adopted Rule 11, or a modification of it, as part of
the state civil procedure code.'" The statutes vary in breadth." While
some call for mandatory sanctions when a motion or pleading is not
made in good faith," others merely provide for discretionary sanc-
161. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETmcs § 16.6.2, at 924 (1986).
162. See id.
163. Absent statutory authority, California and Idaho do not recognize the inherent
power of the courts to award attorney fees as a sanction. See Crowley v. Katleman,
881 P.2d 1083, 1094-95 (Cal. 1994) (en banc) (citing Bauguess v. Paine, 586 P.2d 942,
947-49 (Cal. 1978), abrogated by CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 1982 & Supp.
1995) (suspended from 1995 to 1999)); In re Estate of Keeven, 882 P.2d 457, 465
(Idaho Ct. App. 1994). Yet, at one time, California and Idaho were the only two
states that recognized the private attorney general doctrine. Blue Sky Advocates v.
State, 727 P.2d 644, 649 (Wash. 1986) (en banc); see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5
(West 1980 & Supp. 1995); Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1315 (Cal. 1977) (en
banc); Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 682 P.2d 524, 531 (Idaho 1984). Alaska now recognizes
this doctrine. Anchorage Daily News v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 803 P.2d 402, 404 (Alas-
ka 1990). Further, under Rule 82, fee awards involving public interest litigants may
differ from the schedule provided in the statute. See ALASKA RuLES OF COuin 82
(1994).
Other states also refuse to recognize fee shifting as within the court's inherent
power or severely limit its application. See, e.g., Hearity v. Iowa Dist. Court, 440
N.W.2d 860, 863 (Iowa 1989); Goodover v. Lindey's, Inc., 843 P.2d 765, 775-76 (Mont
1992); Lannon v. Lee Conner Realty Corp., 385 S.E.2d 380, 383 (Va 1989).
164. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.21 (West 1988) (providing for discretionary
sanctions). For a list of 34 state statutes that reflect the 1983-1993 Federal Rule 11,
see Gerald F. Hess, Rule 11 Practice in Federal and State Court, An Empirical,
Comparative Study, 75 MARQ. L REV. 313, 316 n.9 (1992). As of 1992, 16 states had
statutes that were similar to the pre-1983 Federal Rule. Id. at 315 n.8.
165. See Wade, supra note 16, at 466.
166. See, e.g., Amz REv. STAT. ANN. R. 11 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994).
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tions. 67 For the reasons noted in the discussion of Federal Rule 11,"6
statutes modeled on this Rule are not a satisfactory or complete answer
to problems created by unmeritorious litigation.
2. General Legislation
States have attempted to deal with the problem of frivolous lawsuits
by enacting general legislation. As of 1986, over twenty states had passed
legislation to counter vexatious claims,"n and since then other states
have followed suit.7 ' Professors Johnson and Cassady note that, under
these statutes, the principal sanction available to courts is fee shift-
ing. '7 Once again, some statutes provide for mandatory sanctions,"n
but these appear to be in the minority."7
167. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.21 (West 1988).
168. See supra notes 58-92 and accompanying text
169. The majority of states have a general statute allowing the court to award sanc-
tions for frivolous claims. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01 (West 1992);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-99 (West 1991) (providing only a nominal recovery); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 57.105 (West 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 617.16 (West Supp. 1995); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-2007 (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.21 (West 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 28-26-01 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.84.185 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); see
also Johnson & Cassady, supra note 17, at 958-60 (discussing state statutes); Wade,
supra note 16, at 457-68 (discussing state statutes and rules); Raymond A. Nolan,
Comment, Ohio's Frivolous Conduct Statute: A Need for Stronger Deterrence, 21 CAP.
U. L REV 261, 262-63 n.4 (1992) (listing 11 state statutes designed to counter vex-
atious claims).
170. See generally Parness, supra note 27 (discussing various states statutes); Note,
State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the American Rule?,
47 LAW & CONTEmp. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 321 (surveying state fee-shifting statutes)
[hereinafter Note, Are We Quietly Repealing].
171. Johnson & Cassady, supra note 17, at 958-59.
172. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-17-101 (West 1987), 13-17-102 (West 1987 &
Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.105 (West 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-15-14 (Harrison
1993 & Supp. 1995) (providing for mandatory sanctions if the claim or defense is
completely unreasonable and for discretionary sanctions if the claim or defense is
substantially unreasonable); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750. para. 60/226 (Smith-Hurd 1993 &
Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2007 (1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 6f
(West 1985 & Supp. 1995); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2591 (West Supp. 1995);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 814.025 (West 1995).
173. Professor Wade analyzed many of the pertinent statutes in his 1986 article. See
Wade, supra note 16, at 457-67. Although some of the statutes have undergone revi-
sion, most remain current
A typical statute provides that courts may impose sanctions for claims
or defenses made in bad faith or without substantial justification.'74
Nonetheless, some statutes do not penalize good faith efforts to extend
existing law.'75 Functionally, a finding of bad faith seems necessary un-
der most of these statutes. Although this general legislation may be use-
ful where the court has no inherent power to impose attorney fees for
bad faith conduct, the statutes normally do not apply unless the bad faith
is obvious or extreme.
3. Specific Statutes
While many states have passed specific statutes to counter unreason-
able litigation,7 ' this Comment will explore only the legislation in Alas-
ka, Texas and California, which represent the wide variety of state fee-
shifting statutes. Alaska most closely models the English system."7
Texas has more fee-shifting statutes than many states,' including, for
example, a blanket provision that covers contract claims.76 Of all the
states, California has the most fee-shifting statutes."i
a. Alaska's Rule 82
Alaska has the most complete fee-shifting scheme in the United
States; ' however, Alaska's system is a pale modification of the English
rule." Under Rule 82, the prevailing party recovers only 1% to 30% of
174. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. R. 1-341 (1995).
175. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.21 (West 1988) (stating that '[n]othing herein
shall authorize the award of [monetary sanctions] against a party or attorney...
if... supported by a good faith argument for the extension . . . of the existing
law-).
176. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 396-q (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1994) (address-
ing unlawful selling practices).
177. See Note, Are We Quietly Repealing, supra note 170, at 337.
178. See id. at 336. The 1983 survey showed that Western States tended to enact
more fee-shifting statutes of all types. See id. at 339. Four states enacted almost 25%
of the statutes. See id. at 337. North Carolina had the fewest fee-shifting statutes. See
id. at 336. Apparently the most recent survey of any breadth, this 1983 survey is
widely cited.
179. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (West 1986); itra notes 195-
206 and accompanying text.
180. In 1983, California had 146 fee-shifting statutes, the most of any state. Note,
Are We Quietly Repeaing, supra note 170, at 335-37. California currently has "hun-
dreds" of such statutes. See RIcHARD M. PEARL, CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS
§ 2.1 (Christopher D. Dworin ed., 2d ed. 1994).
181. See Kordziel, supra note 46, at 429; Note, Are We Quietly Repealing, supra
note 170, at 337; see also ALAN J. TOMNS & THOMAS E. WnLGING, TAXATION OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES: PRAcTIcES IN ENGLISH, ALASKAN, AND FEDERAL CouRTS 31-47 (1986).
182. See TOMiUNS & WLLGING, supra note 181, at 32-34; Kordziel, supra note 46, at
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his attorney fees,"n which are determined by the court according to a
sliding scale written into the Rule." For instance, if a judgment is un-
contested and exceeds $500,000, including prejudgment interest, the pre-
vailing party receives 1% of his attorney fees."s If the case proceeds to
trial and the recovery is $25,000, however, the prevailing party receives
2096 of his attorney fees."M The successful litigant receives 30% of his
attorney fees if his case goes to trial and he receives no monetary recov-
ery.'7 Rule 82 also allows the court flexibility and discretion to vary the
fees;" however, the court must evaluate exceptions using particular
factors and must explain its reasons for varying an award.'" Reasons
for varying attorney fees include bad faith conduct and "the extent to
which a given fee award may be so onerous to the nonprevaling party
that it would deter similarly situated litigants from the voluntary use of
the courts.""9 Rule 82 is further limited by time restraints. For the pre-
vailing party to recover counsel fees, he must file a timely motion with
the court.'' Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the fees. '9
429.
183. ALASKA Civ. R. 82.
184. See ALASKA Civ. R. 82(b)(1).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. ALASKA CIv. R. 82(b)(2). If a case is resolved without trial, the court awards
the prevailing party 2096 of his attorney fees. Id.
188. See ALAsKA CIv. R. 82(b)(3).
189. Id. The factors of Rule 82 are:
[T]he complexity of the litigation; the length of trial; the reasonableness of
the attorneys' hourly rates and the number of hours expended; the reason-
ableness of the number of attorneys used; the attorneys' efforts to minimize
fees; the reasonableness of the claims and defenses pursued by each side;
vexatious or bad faith conduct; the relationship between the amount of work
performed and the significance of the matters at stake; the extent to which a
given fee award may be so onerous to the nonprevailing party that it would
deter similarly situated litigants from the voluntary use of the courts; the
extent to which the fees incurred by the prevailing party suggest that they
had been influenced by considerations apart from the case at bar, such as a
desire to discourage claims by others against the prevailing party or its insur-
er, and other equitable factors deemed relevant.
ALAsKA Civ. R. 82(b)(3) (subsection lettering omitted). Justice Rabinowitz dissented
when the court added this provision to Rule 82. See ALASKA RULES OF COURT 182
(1994).
190. ALASKA Civ. R. 82(b)(3)(1).
191. ALAsKA Cirv. R. 82(c). The motion for counsel fees must be filed within 10 days
after the certified date of judgment. Id.
192. Id.
Attorneys criticize Rule 82 for discouraging novel or colorable
claims." The principal failing of the Alaskan system is, however, that
partial fee shifting neither protects champions of meritorious claims nor
fully compensates wronged parties.
b. The Texas Statutes
Texas also allows the prevailing party to recover attorney fees in some
cases. 5 The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code states:
A person may recover reasonable attorney's fees from an individual or corpora-
tion, in addition to the amount of a valid claim and costs, if the claim is for. (1)
rendered services; (2) performed labor, (3) furnished material; (4) freight or ex-
press overcharges; (5) lost or damaged freight or express; (6) killed or injured
stock; (7) a sworn account; or (8) an oral or written contract."
In addition to the above, specific statutes allow fee shifting for causes
of action that are either generally easy to prove or reflect a strong public
interest. For instance, litigation involving estate taxes,'97 towing and
storing vehicles, and warehouseman's liens" may seem singularly
specific for fee-shifting legislation. These actions may be distinguished,
however, as involving debts that are usually easy to prove. Similarly,
statutes governing fee shifting for landlord-tenant disputes," political
193. Kordziel, supra note 46, at 430-31 (asserting that a "sizeable contingent of the
Alaska Bar" sought the abrogation of the statute). Compare generally Andrew J.
Kleinfeld, Alaska: Where the Loser Pays the Winner's Fees, JUDGES' J., Spring 1985, at
4 (noting the limitations of Rule 82 and claiming it should be abolished) and Andrew
J. Kleinfeld, On Shifting Attorneys' Fees in Alaska: A Rebuttal, JUDGES' J., Summer
1985, at 39 (claiming that promoting settlements may not serve justice) with James
A. Parrish, The Alaska Rules Are a Success: Plaintiffs View, JUDGES' J., Spring 1985,
at 8 (claiming that fee shifting encourages settlements and discourages only plaintiffs
who file nuisance claims) and H. Bixler Whiting, The Alaska Rules Are a Success:
Defendant's View, JUDGES' J., Spring 1985, at 9 (stating that fee shifting protects inno-
cent defendants).
194. See ALASKA Civ. R. 82. Compare Demoski v. New, 737 P.2d 780, 788 (Alaska
1987) (holding that it is an abuse of discretion to award the prevailing party the full
amount of the legal fees incurred) with ALASKA RULES OF COURT 182 (1994) (stating
that an "award of full attorney's fees is manifestly unreasonable in the absence of
bad faith ... by the nonprevailing party"). See generally Kordziel, supra note 46
(claiming that the exceptions of the most recent Rule 82 have affected the statute's
usefulness).
195. See, e.g., TEx PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.058(c) (West Supp. 1995).
196. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (West 1986).
197. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 322A(y) (West Supp. 1995).
198. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701g-2 § 11 (West Supp. 1995).
199. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.0062 (West Supp. 1995).
200. Id. § 92.058 (West Supp. 1995).
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campaign reports, 201 and distribution of alcoholic beverages 202 reflect
public policy concerns that these areas may be particularly subject to
abuse. Actions regarding state purchasing contracts 203 and city building
ordinances 2°u trigger fee shifting because the government is a party to
the action. These Texas statutes, while limited in scope, provide an im-
portant model, because the award of attorney fees is mandatory.'n The
statutes do not address a primary area of abuse, however, since tort
claims are not part of the "loser pays" scheme in Texas.2°
c. The California Statutes
Although California did not have a statewide version of Rule 11 until
recently,0 7 it has had a general statute dealing with frivolous
actions.2° Codifying judicial definition,2° section 128.5 of the Califor-
201. TEL ELEC. CODE ANN. § 254.231 (West Supp. 1995).
202. TE)L ALCo. BEV. CODE ANN. § 102.79 (West Supp. 1995).
203. TEx GOVT CODE ANN. § 2251.043 (West Supp. 1995).
204. TEL LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. § 214.0015 (West Supp. 1995).
205. See, e.g., id; see also Maggs & Weiss, supra note 48, at 1921. Texas does have
some older fee-shifting statutes that are discretionary. For example, attorney's fees
may be awarded to the prevailing party in an action for adverse possession of prop-
erty. See TEL Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 16.034 (West 1986) (enacted in 1977).
206. See generally Maggs & Weiss, supra note 48 (discussing fee-shifting statutes).
Although Texas also has a Rule 11 analogue, it is limited by the requirements that
courts must presume that claims are brought in good faith and that "[n]o sanc-
tions . . . may be imposed except for good cause, the particulars of which must be
stated in the sanction order." TEL R. CIv. P. ANN. r. 13 (West Supp. 1995). Because
of this language, Rule 13 is, in effect, discretionary. Craig Enoch, Incivility in the
Legal System? Maybe It's the Rules, 47 SMU L REV. 199, 218 n.126 (1994); see Maggs
& Weiss, supra note 48, at 1942-43 (maintaining that "Rule 13 sanctions are too
difficult to obtain because of a presumption of good faith"). For a discussion of rules
that allow Texas courts to sanction litigants, see generally Jason C. Smith & Jim
Hund, Avoiding Sanctions: Trying to Dodge the Bullet, 25 TEx. TECH. L REv. 3
(1993).
207. California has experimented with Rule 11 analogues. Recently repealed, § 447
of the California Civil Procedure Code provided for implementation of a Rule 11
analogue in two counties, Riverside and San Bernardino. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 447 (repealed 1994). This statute was experimental and due to expire on January 1,
1998; however, it was replaced with a statewide statute modeled on the 1993 version
of Federal Rule 11. See 1994 Cal. Stat. 1062 (AB. 3594); see also Maryann Jones,
"Stop, Think and Investigate". Should California Adopt Federal Rule 11?, 22 Sw. U.
L REV. 337, 363-71 (1993) (concluding that California should not have a statewide
Rule 11 analogue); Georgene M. Vairo, The New Rule 11: Past as Prologue?, 28 LoY.
LA. L REV. 39, 41-42 (1994) (comparing § 447 to the 1983 version of Rule 11).
208. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995).
209. See In re Marriage of Flaherty, 646 P.2d 179, 187 (Cal. 1982) (en banc) (noting
nia Code of Civil Procedure defines frivolous as "totally and completely
without merit" or "for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing par-
ty."" ° Either prong of this definition would be a difficult burden for an
opposing party to prove. Even though this statute provides a limited
remedy, the California Legislature has suspended the operation of section
128.5 for four years.1 ' Moreover, section 128.5, which currently applies
only to complaints filed on or before December 31, 1994, and section
128.7, the Rule 11 analogue that replaces section 128.5 until 1999, are
discretionary. 2 The usefulness of these narrow statutes are mitigated
by California judges who "give too much deference to 'the mystical right
to bring suit'" and thus decline to impose sanctions on vexatious
litigants.21
3
In addition to sections 128.5 and 128.7, California has many specific
statutes that allow for fee shifting to the prevailing party in a variety of
circumstances. 21 4 According to one survey, California has over twice as
many fee-shifting statutes as Texas.21 '5 For example, courts may award
that "an appeal should be held to be frivolous only when it is prosecuted for an
improper motive-to harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse judg-
ment-or when it indisputably has no merit-when any reasonable attorney would
agree that the appeal is totally and completely without merit" (citing Estate of
Walters, 222 P.2d 100, 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950)). Flaherty requires both subjective
and objective analysis of the merits of a claim. Id. at 186-87; see, e.g., Simonian v.
Patterson, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722, 729 (Ct. App. 1994). Additionally, the "weight of au-
thority requires" a finding of bad faith; however, the "bad faith requirement does not
impose a determination of evil motive and subjective bad faith may be inferred from
the prosecution of a frivolous action." Childs v. Painewebber Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d
93, 102 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing West Coast Dev. v. Reed, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 795 (Ct.
App. 1992)).
210. CAL CIv. PRoc. CODE § 128.5(b)(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1995).
211. 1994 Cal. Stat. 1062 (A.B. 3594); see supra note 6. Sections 128.7 and 446 of
the California Civil Procedure Code replace § 128.5 from January 1, 1995, to January
1, 1999. 1994 Cal. Stat. 1062.
212. Section 128.5(a) states in pertinent part "Every trial court may order a party,
the party's attorney, or both to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney's
fees, incurred by another party as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are
frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay." CAL. CIv. PROc. CODE
§ 128.5(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1995) (emphasis added); see id. § 128.5(b)(1) (amend-
ing the statute to limit its application). Section 128.7 provides that "after notice and a
reasonable opportunity to respond,... the court may, subject to the conditions
stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or par-
ties that have [brought a frivolous claim]." CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 128.7(c) (West
Supp. 1995) (emphasis added). Additionally, the court may not award monetary sanc-
tions under § 128.7 if a party withdraws or settles a claim. CAL CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 128.7(d).
213. Sackett, supra note 36, at 24.
214. See, e.g., infra notes 216-27 and accompanying text.
215. Maggs & Weiss, supra note 48, at 1944 n.43.
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attorney fees in cases dealing with domestic violence21 or those con-
cerning the unsolicited sending of merchandise."7 Procedural concerns,
such as a party unreasonably requesting or contesting a change of venue,
may trigger an award of attorney fees.218 Some fee-shifting statutes,
such as those that award counsel fees to the prevailing party in dog-
breeding disputes,"9 also require a finding of bad faith. Very specific
circumstances, such as breach of contract for the construction of swim-
ming pools, ° trigger the mandatory fee-shifting statutes. Yet, the major-
ity of the statutes are discretionary.22
Although California has many two-way fee-shifting statutes, most pro-
tect only the prevailing plaintiff.'n Even when a statute's language is
discretionary and allows for recovery by either party, courts interpret it
as presumptively requiring awards to plaintiffs and disallowing fee shift-
ing to defendants.' The discretionary statutes permit fee shifting to de-
fendants only when the plaintiffs suit was "frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation." Additionally, fees may be shifted to a plaintiff
when the court involuntarily dismisses the case or when the parties
settle the claim before trial."
In spite of its many fee-shifting statutes, California lacks an effective
blanket provision to counter nuisance litigation. In fact, the state's
proplaintiff stance may encourage litigation. 7 Further, while many Cali-
216. CAL FAM. CODE app. § 547 (West 1995).
217. CAL CIV. CODE § 1584.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995).
218. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 396(b) (West Supp. 1995).
219. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25989.555 (West Supp. 1995).
220. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7168 (West Supp. 1995).
221. PEARL, supra note 180, § 2.4.
222. See, e.g., CAL LAB. CODE § 1697.1(c) (West Supp. 1995) (providing for fee
shifting when plaintiff is injured by false, fraudulent or misleading representations
concerning transportation fees); see also Winick Corp. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America,
232 Cal. Rptr. 479, 480 (Ct App. 1986) (noting that most statutes shift fees one way,
in favor of a prevailing plaintiff); PEARL, supra note 180, § 2.4.
223. PEARL, supra note 180, § 2.4; see Sokolow v. County of San Mateo, 261 Cal.
Rptr. 520, 528 (Ct. App. 1989).
224. PEARL, supra note 180, § 2.7.
225. Id. § 2.21.
226. Id. § 2.25. California's law may differ from federal proplaintiff fee-shifting stat-
utes. The Supreme Court determined in Evan v. Jeff D. that a settlement under a
federal statute may include matters relating to the attorney fees. 475 U.S. 717, 730-31
n.19 (1986) (stating that the statute "vests the right to attorney's fees in the 'prevail-
ing party' rather than in his attorney").
227. See PEARL, supra note 180, § 2.5.
fornia statutes award attorney fees to the prevailing party, California, like
Texas, fails to address the variety of tort claims overburdening the court
system. As a result, "Rambo" lawyers and avid litigants thrive in Califor-
nia.' Moreover, suspending section 128.5 and creating a Rule 11 ana-
logue modeled on the weakened federal statute is insufficient to discour-
age meritless litigation. The state needs additional legislation to deter
vexatious suits and to compensate wronged parties.
V. THE ARGUMENT FOR FEE SHIFING
Ideally, the system should minimize conflicts by insuring that the rules are clear
and that disagreements are resolved rapidly. The trouble is that lawyers' well-
being runs in the opposite direction. The more conflict, the better.m
Two-way fee shifting' ° serves two goals: compensation to the injured
party and deterrence of nuisance claims."I The American rule, however,
does neither. The sole justification for the American rule is that it allows
everyone-even one with no reasonable claim-to have his day in court.
While proponents of the American rule claim this ensures the growth of
the common law, 2 not all commentators agree that the American rule
can be supported on this basis.' Most commentators recognize that
.the American rule chills some meritorious claims while encouraging mar-
228. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text; cf. Gideon Kanner, Welcome Home
Rambo: High-Minded Ethics and Low-Down Tactics in the Courts, 25 Loy. LA. L
REv. 81, 87-96 (1991) (describing attorney misconduct at trial and judicial reluctance
to impose sanctions). See generally Sackett, supra note 36 (claiming that fee-shifting
statutes are ineffective since they apply in rare instances and judges do not use them
in any case).
229. Robert J. Samuelson, Go Ahead, Bash Lawyers: The People Who Should Make
the System Better Are Making It Worse, WASH. PosT, Apr. 22, 1992, at A21, reprinted
in Robert J. Samuelson, I am a Big Lawyer Basher, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 27, 1992, at 62,
62.
230. Two-way fee shifting awards attorneys' fees to either the prevailing plaintiff or
defendant. Conversely, most one-way fee-shifting statutes award counsel fees solely to
a prevailing plaintiff. See intfra note 291 and accompanying text.
231. See Lawyers' Responsibilities to the Courts, supra note 58, at 1632-34 (discuss-
ing "use of Rule 11 as a fee-shifting device").
232. See In re Michael Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 182 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("Our longstanding tradition of leaving our door open to all classes of litigants is a
proud and decent one worth maintaining.") (citing Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470
U.S. 1067, 1070 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring)). Commentators usually do not defend
the American rule on any other basis. See generally Yaramoto, supra note 11 (argu-
ing that the American rule ensures the growth of the law and protects civil rights).
233. See, e.g., Ehrezweig, supra note 29 (asserting that the American rule does not
provide open access to courts for the less powerful). But see generally Vargo, supra
note 8 (claiming that the English rule does not deter frivolous claims or compensate
to any greater extent than the American rule, which provides open access to courts).
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ginal ones.2 4 Although some legal scholars claim that the American rule
is necessary to guarantee all people access to the courts' and credit it
with the social progress of recent years,'a others claim that the Ameri-
can rule suppresses test claims. 7 Thus, it is arguable whether the
American rule deserves significant credit for social advancements. In any
case, the rule presents a conundrum. The rule may provide access to
courts to those with new claims, but it denies access to those whose
claims are small.'
Courts are not truly open to those with small claims when the system
penalizes them for bringing suit. Moreover, current avenues of redress do
not adequately mitigate the negative aspects of the American rule. Be-
cause they are "limited in terms of jurisdiction, availability, and exper-
tise," ' small claims courts do not furnish an adequate solution for
those with modest claims.24 ° Further, the bulwark of the American rule,
234. See, e.g., Mause, supra note 33, at 35-36.
235. See generally Yaramoto, supra note 11 (stating that the American rule assures
open access). But see Samuelson, supra note 229, at A21, reprinted in NEWSWEEK,
April 27, 1992, at 62. Samuelson points out that arguments claiming the American
rule allows poor people to sue large companies do not reflect reality. Id. Poor people
do not sue large companies; lawyers do. See id. Further, lawyers may solicit clients
for this purpose and still have a contingency-fee arrangement Fee shifting would
probably dampen the lawyers, and the occasional layperson's, enthusiasm for litigious
sport.
236. See, e.g., Vairo, supra note 23, at 475, 494. Professor Vairo cites Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemented by, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) and Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) as examples of social progress attributable to the Amer-
ican rule. Vairo, supra note 23, at 475, 494. This Comment's proposal would not
affect constitutional cases such as Brown or Roe.
237. See, e.g., Medina, supra note 29, at 1185-86.
238. See generally Note, Fee Simple: A Proposal to Adopt a Two-Way Fee Shift for
Low-Income Litigants, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1231 (1988) (arguing that the American nle
denies access to many low-income claimants) [hereinafter Note, Fee Simple]. For a
compelling discussion and excellent sources regarding fee shifting in the context of
mandatory pro bono service, see Ronald H. Siverman, Conceiving a Lawyer's Legal
Duty to the Poor, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 885, 1095-99 (1991).
The theory behind one-way fee shifting applies to two-way fee shifting as well.
See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565
(1986) (stating that a plaintiff may "find it possible to engage a lawyer based on the
statutory assurance that he will be paid a 'reasonable fee'"), rev'd on other grounds,
483 U.S. 711 (1987). See generally Mark S. Stein, Is One-Way Fee Shifting Fairer
Than Two-Way Fee Shifting?, 141 F.R.D. 351 (1992) ("For every claim of right by a
plaintiff there is a reciprocal and equivalent claim of right by a defendant").
239. Phyllis A. Monroe, Comment, Financial Barriers to Litigation: Attorney Fees
and the Problem of Legal Access, 46 ALB. L REV. 148, 161 (1981).
240. See generally Arthur Best et al., Peace, Wealth, Happiness, and Small Claims
contingency fees,"' provide no incentive when the claim is modest.
Lawyers seek high return on risk. Few would take a lawsuit on a con-
tingency fee basis that would, if it succeeded, return less than normal
hourly fees. For this reason, commentators note that the English rule
would be a boon to people with honest, but modest, claims. 2 Because
lawyers could recover reasonable fees when a valid claim or defense
succeeded, fee shifting encourages lawyers to represent indigent clients
on speculation.2' Therefore, in terms of equity, the English rule is supe-
rior to the American rule. The English rule opens access to the courts to
those with small, well-grounded claims, whereas the American rule pre-
vents access. Furthermore, the English rule compensates the victim, but
the American rule does not.2" Generally, commentators acknowledge
Courts: A Case Study, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 343 (1994) (discussing problems with
small claims courts); Barbara Yngvesson & Patricia Hennessey, Small Claims, Com-
plex Disputes: A Review of the Small Claims Literature, 9 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 219
(1975) (analyzing various studies of small claims courts and recommending reform of
the small claims system); Suzanne E. Elwell & Christopher D. Carlson, Contemporary
Studies Project, The Iowa Small Claims Court: An Empirical Analysis, 75 IOWA LAW
REV. 433 (1990) (discussing recent criticisms of the small claims courts and conclud-
ing there is a "need for refinement of the current system"); Beatrice A. Moulton,
Note, The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-Income Litigant as Performed by
the Small Claims Court in California, 21 STAN. L REv. 1657 (1969) (maintaining that
small claims courts deny justice to the poor). Critics of the small claims system note
that it is used primarily by businesses to collect debts. See, e.g., Elwell & Carlson,
supra, at 443-44. Poor and middle-income individuals have less success in small
claims courts than the wealthy because they are less familiar with legal methods and
are more intimidated when appearing pro se. See, e.g., id. at 441-44.
241. Professor Rowe has noted that contingency fees could coexist with two-way
fee shifting as they do in Alaska Rowe, supra note 35, at 674-75; see 2 AMERICAN
LAw INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY
267, 275 (1991). In fact, England has considered allowing contingency fees. Robert B.
Donin, England Looks at a Hybrid Contingent Fee System, 64 A.B.A. J. 773, 773-74
(1978).
242. See, e.g., Note, Fee Simple, supra note 238, at 1236-37 (claiming that the poor
are not able to exercise their rights for lack of representation for small claims, so
.economic actors" are likely to take advantage of them). Logistically, "the party with
the most financial resources is likely to prevail. In any case, it is difficult to see how
forcing parties to pay their own costs furthers equality in litigation." Medina, supra
note 29, at 1186-87.
243. Medina, supra note 29, at 1187.
244. See, e.g., Maggs & Weiss, supra note 48, at 1923-26 (listing theoretical justifica-
tions for fee shifting). This seems self-evident with little need to elaborate. Nonethe-
less, on occasion, creative proponents of the American rule argue that the English
rule does not fully compensate wronged parties and may not benefit those with mod-
est claims. See Vargo, supra note 8, at 1635-36. According to Vargo, authorities
should not consider the English rule until they conduct further "studies." Id. Yet,
Vargo fails to state why studies are needed when, by its terms, fee shifting
compensates. See, e.g., id. Further, the English rule is the law in most of the West-
ern world, and "anyone who has observed both the American and British courts at
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that mandatory two-way fee shifting is the most effective way of deter-
ring nuisance claims and providing complete compensation to the injured
party.' In fact, it is the only way to make a wronged party whole.'
While the American rule deters exactly those who should bring suit,
the English rule provides a deterrent to frivolous litigation."4 A poten-
tial litigant is properly motivated when the probable recovery exceeds
the cost of litigation and dissuaded when the risk exceeds a possible
recovery-or windfall.' Unlike the American rule, which shields liti-
gants from the consequences of bringing an unfounded suit, the English
rile encourages potential litigants to consider the merits of a claim or
defense before asserting it. Although some commentators characterize
fee shifting as punitive,24 such a generalization is only partially accu-
rate. It is more accurately described as a moral and civil duty to pay
one's debts. Indeed, not only is fee shifting not principally punitive, it
may not be a complete deterrent to frivolous actions. Contending that
the English rule does not sufficiently discourage meritless claims, some
commentators recommend sanctions in addition to awarding attorney
fees to the prevailing party.'m
close range knows that there is no more vigorous advocacy or fairer justice than in
British courts, and at the same time they maintain strict regulation of lawyers' profes-
sional conduct, as we do not." WARREN E. BURGER, DELIVERY OF JUSTICE 108 (1990)
(reprint of Burger's speech to the Pound conference in 1976, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-
Need for Systematic Anticipation); see Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience
with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBS., Winter 1984, at 37 (discuss-
ing various countries' fee-shifting schemes).
245. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 35, at 670.
246. See, e.g., id
247. In spite of attempts by opponents of the English rule to downplay its impor-
tance as a deterrent, reputable scholars have accepted this aspect of fee shifting. See,
e.g., Sandra Day O'Connor, Reflections on Preclusion of Judicial Review in England
and the United States, 27 WM. & MARY L REV. 643, 664 (1986) ("[it is] undoubtedly
right to point to the more litigious nature of the American people and to the deter-
rent function served by the English rule on costs and attorney's fees."). Further, fee
shifting may be a more effective deterrent to meritless claims than sanctions and
may invite fewer appeals. See WILLGING, supra note 66, at 136.
248. See generally POSNER, supra note 33, at 53742 (describing mathematical likeli-
hood of settling claims under the American and English rules); Polinsky & Rubinfeld,
supra note 27 (providing abstract analysis of deterrent effects of American and Eng-
lish rules).
249. This is one of the rationales that Professor Rowe considers for fee shifting.
Rowe, supra note 35, at 660-61.
250. See Polinsky & Rubinfeld, supra note 27, at 425-26.
Within the realm of fee shifting, deterrence and compensation are two
aspects of fairness. Although both the English and the American rule
deter some plaintiffs from bringing suit,25' the American rule "subsidizes
meritless litigation."252 Moreover, since fairness informs public policy,
worthy claims should receive priority over spurious ones. Yet, critics of
the English rule isolate the deterrent aspect and unfairly focus on mathe-
matical models and abstract analysis to argue that two-way fee shifting is
ineffective.'a In addition to denying that the English rule is a deterrent
to baseless claims a an amazing position that perpetuates the stereo-
type that lawyers and legal scholars value clever arguments over the
truth-proponents of the American rule largely ignore the equitable as-
pects of two-way fee shifting.'m
The irony of the American rule is that, because of it, courts are truly
open to only two groups: lawyers and the wealthy.' The American rule
exists, in part, because attorneys lobbied for it."? The English rule that
was in existence in Colonial America limited the amount of fees that a
lawyer could recover."M Conversely, the American rule allowed attor-
251. See Mause, supra note 33, at 35-37.
252. Maggs & Weiss, supra note 48, at 1926.
253. See Hylton, supra note 26, at 1071 ("Not a shred of empirical evidence on the
compliance effects of alternative fee shifting rules exists, however, and it is unlikely
that it ever will, given the cost of the required experiments."); see also POSNER, supra
note 33, at 537-42 (providing mathematical analysis to demonstrate that the English
rule induces fewer settlements than the American rule); Donohue, supra note 33, at
1094 (arguing that mathematical analysis determines that neither rule produces more
settlements). But see Polinsky & Rubinfeld, supra note 27, at 422-23 (concluding
through economic analysis that sanctions are necessary to deter frivolous litigation,
even under the English rule). Professor Mase's thoughtful article discusses the prob-
able effects of fee shifting and also illustrates his predictions in chart form. See gen-
erally Mause, supra note 33 (asserting that strong claims generally are settled before
trial, but that the particular facts and the parties' opinions of their positions' merits
determine whether marginal claims are litigated).
Professor Cohen notes the differences between the disciplines of law and eco-
nomics. See Lloyd Cohen, A Different Black Voice in Legal Scholarship, 37 N.Y.L.
SCH. L REv. 301, 321 (1992). "Our law is about and for human beings. While a good
mathematician may be an immature and disturbed savant, a good legal scholar may
not. Those who propose to tell us something normatively important about law should
have an insight into what people are about." Id.
254. See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 26, at 1071.
255. See generally Vargo, supra note 8 (arguing that one-way fee shifting in favor
of prevailing plaintiffs provides the most effective way to ensure justice).
256. See, e.g., Monroe, supra note 239, at 159-61 (claiming that those with greater
resources prevail in lawsuits). Small claims courts are a very limited solution to this
problem. Id. at 161.
257. See Leubsdorf, supra note 8, at 16-17.
258. Id. at 14-16.
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neys to charge market rates for their services. 9 Perhaps fearing a re-
turn to the fee restraints of Colonial America, attorneys often oppose
modifications of the American rule." Yet, an attorney's self-interest dis-
torts his perception of fairness."' Even if ethics codes do not proscribe
self-dealing in every instance," lawmakers have a moral duty to ensure
fairness to an injured party. If maintaining the status quo of attorneys is
at odds with that principle, the status quo must change. No one has a
constitutional right to file a frivolous lawsuit." Concomitantly, attor-
neys have no inherent right to a favored position in society to the detri-
ment of the average citizen.
The proponents of the American rule have some basis for their enthu-
siasm. When legislatures delay enacting new law, courts may take the
initiative. This is important in civil rights cases,' but has been true in
other instances as well. For instance, Judge Cardozo's seminal opinion in
MacPherson v. Buick" advanced the negligence theory of product lia-
bility by determining that a manufacturer is liable for defective products
where there is no privity between the injured party and the manufactur-
er." In another case, Li v. Yellow Cab," the California Supreme
Court rejected the existing theory of contributory negligence and adopt-
ed a pure comparative negligence standard.' This holding reflected a
growing trend in the law. Before the decision in Li, half of the states
recognized comparative negligence," but currently only a few states
259. Id. at 16.
260. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, The English Ruie, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 54, 54-
58 (discussing opposition to the English rule).
261. "[Tjhe interests of the profession are not fully congruent with those of the
general public." GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ET AL, THE LAW AND E'I11CS OF LAWYERING
443 (2d ed. 1994).
262. According to the American Bar Association's Model Rules, an attorney can use
confidential client information as long as it is not to the client's detriment. MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(b) (1994) ("A lawyer shall not use informa-
tion relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the
client consents after consultation . . .).
263. See Cheek v. Doe, 828 F.2d 395, 397 (7th Cir.) (quoting Coleman v. Commis-
sioner, 791 F.2d 68, 72 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 955 (1987)).
264. See generally Tobias, supra note 16 (suggesting civil rights claims should not
be subject to sanctions).
265. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
266. Id. at 1053-55.
267. 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975) (en banc).
268. Id at 1229.
269. Id. at 1232.
retain the contributory negligence defense.27 Yet, in the overwhelming
majority of states, the legislature, not the courts, effected the change in
the law.27" ' Further, while judicial law may be innovative in some cases,
it is not always commendable. In Dillon v. Legg,272 the California Su-
preme Court created controversial new law. A narrow majority in Dillon
held that a bystander who observes injury to a close relative could recov-
er damages for emotional distress.273 Most states rejected this minority
view for not providing a clear standard of liability.274 From these well-
known cases, one might surmise that the American rule facilitates the
judicial creation of new rights.
Yet, it is anomalous to acknowledge a right without a satisfactory
means of enforcing it. When a person is subject to a harassment lawsuit,
he has a right to defend it. Nevertheless, he may be unwilling or unable
to defend the suit unless he is indemnified for all costs incurred. Often,
in effect, the law welcomes to court one who wishes to challenge the
law and turns away one who wishes to enforce it. Further, it is not
enough that he who insists on enforcing his rights prevails in court. The
law must also make him whole. A plaintiff with a legitimate claim de-
serves full compensation from the defendant, at least as far as a money
judgment can do so. A prevailing defendant, generally an unwilling partic-
ipant in the legal process, deserves to be indemnified, so that burden-
some legal fees do not further victimize him. Current law does not ade-
quately compensate the prevailing party and thus impairs his ability to
bring or defend the lawsuit. Therefore, while the American rule may
provide an alternate avenue for the creation of new rights, it also inhibits
the vindication of rights already in existence. The purpose of the Ameri-
can rule and its consequences are contradictory: To facilitate social
change, American courts must dispense injustice.
When sacrificing individual justice to a perceived greater good, it is
wise to periodically re-examine and retest the social benefits against the
mores of the time. Perhaps the American rule was justifiable at one time,
but it needs to be re-examined now. Taking a small, but significant, step
towards the English rule is one way to effect change.
270. PROSSER ET AL, supra note 145, at 578.
271. Id.
272. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (en banc).
273. Id. at 925.
274. See Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678, 682-83 (N.D. 1972) (stating
that the "artificial" and "unpredictable" rule could impose limitless liability) (quoting
Di//on, 441 P.2d at 926 (Burke, J., dissenting)).
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VI. A MODEL STATUTE
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
§____: Attorney Fees
(a) Allowance to Prevailing Party.
(1) The prevailing party in a motion for summary judgment under section [56]
of this code shall be awarded reasonable attorney fees.
(2) A prevailing party in a motion for involuntary dismissal under section [41]
of this code shall be awarded reasonable attorney fees. Under this subsection
"prevailing party" refers to the party who did not initiate the claim or counter-
claim.
(3) A prevailing party in a motion for dismissal under section [12] of this code
shall be awarded reasonable attorney fees. Under this subsection "prevailing par-
ty" refers to the party who did not initiate the claim or counterclaim. [Cause for
dismissal under section [121 are (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
(2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of
process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join a party under section [19] of this
code.] 2&
(b) Limitations of this Section. This provision shall not apply to claims based on
federal issues, child custody disputes, or first-party insurance claims.
(c) Determining Reasonable Fees. The court may determine the reasonable
amount of attorney fees awarded under this section not to exceed [the amount
currently required to bring a diversity action in federal courts].
(d) Exceptions to this Section.
(1) Upon motion, the court may vary an attorney fee award in any action that
was brought to enforce an important right affecting the public interest if a signifi-
cant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, would have been conferred on
the general public or a large class of persons if the action had succeeded.'
(2) If the court varies an award, the court shall explain the reasons for the
variation.'
(3) A motion for an exception to this section must be filed within 10 days after
the date shown in the clerk's certificate of distribution on the judgment m
275. The list of reasons to dismiss under this subsection are taken verbatim from
Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
276. This subsection is modeled on § 1021.5 of the California Code of Civil Proce-
dure. See CAL CIv. PRoc. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1993).
277. ALASKA CIv. R. 82(b)(3).
278. ALASKA CIrv. R. 82(c).
VII. THE PROPOSAL AND WHY PUBLIC INTEREST REQUIRES- IT
We are not to ... shut our eyes to living needs, and yet we are not to find a living




Under this proposal, the court must award reasonable attorney fees to
the prevailing party28 on a motion for summary judgment28" ' or
dismissal'm in most state cases. Undoubtedly, a statute consistent with
this proposal would discourage many unwarranted lawsuits,' but, most
importantly, it would be fair.
The proposal suggested here ensures fairness because proceedings that
end before trial lack merit either procedurally or substantively. Courts do
not grant summary judgments lightly, and, at least in federal court, a
case is dismissed before trial either for procedural reasons or for behav-
ior of the claimant that is inconsistent with maintaining the suit.'
Judges award summary judgments only when no material issue of law or
fact exists.'m Thus, awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing party is
279. BENJAMIN N. CARDOzO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 76 (1924).
280. It may be difficult to define "prevailing party" in some fee-shifting schemes. See
Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980) (stating that a "prevailing plaintiff' may include
one whose rights are vindicated by consent decree or settlement). No such difficulty
exists with this proposal because its scope is quite narrow and it pertains to both
parties. The prevailing party is the party prevailing on the motion.
281. Currently, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the judge may award
attorney's fees pursuant to a summary judgment when the filing has been made in
bad faith. FED. R. Cirv. P. 56(g). The proposal here would make it mandatory rather
than discretionary.
282. In federal court, Rule 12 or Rule 41(b) would apply. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 12;
FED. R Civ. P. 41(b); supra notes 60-62. This proposal does not apply to a voluntary
dismissal, but does apply to all dismissals of the action that are not voluntary. See
FED. R Civ. P. 41(a); supra note 61. In the interest of concision, this Comment may
refer to dismissals in general. Summary judgment carries a higher burden of proof to
dismiss a claim. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 56 with FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and FED. R.
Cirv. P. 12.
283. This proposal cannot curtail all meritless litigation. A number of opportunistic
lawsuits proceed to trial. In one recent case, an unsupervised five-year-old child rode
a tricycle down a hill into a street. Cummings v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 502
(W.D. Va. 1994). The child suffered serious injury when a car driven by an elderly
woman hit him. Id. at 503. The parents sued the tricycle manufacturer for product
liability based on inadequate warning. Id. at 503-04. Although the company warned
parents that they must supervise their children and that the tricycle was unsafe on
sloping driveways, the company did not specifically warn against sloping hills. Id. The
parents requested punitive damages. Id. at 503. The court granted the defendant par-
tial summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages with the rest of the claims
to be decided at trial. Id. at 505-07.
284. FED. R. Cirv. P. 41(b) (stating reasons to dismiss that include "falure ... to
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court").
285. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56; CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 437c (West Supp. 1994).
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fair because, if the motion for summary judgment succeeds, the claim is
objectively without merit. Moreover, even when dismissal is granted for
procedural reasons in state or federal courts,' the comparatively brief
duration of the proceedings limits the burden to the losing party.'
The Federal Rule states in pertinent part
The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing
affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on fie, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
FED. R. Crv. P. 56(c).
Under Rule 56, courts resolve any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue
of material fact against the moving party, in a light most favorable to the opposing
party. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Summary judgments,
once rarely employed, have become more routine in recent years. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (noting that summary judgments are necessary to the
scheme of justice); Robert K Smits, Comment, Federal Summary Judgment: The "New"
Workhorse for an Overburdened Federal Court System, 20 U.C. DAVIS L REv. 955, 969-
70 (1987) (commenting that federal courts grant summary judgments with greater fre-
quency than in the past). The standards for granting or denying sununary judgments in
state courts may vary, but the modern trend favors a greater use of summary judg-
ments. See, e.g., Sheila A. Leute, Comment, The Effective Use of Summary Judgment.
A Comparison of Federal and Texas Standards, 40 BAYLOR L REV. 617, 640 (1988)
(recommending more frequent use of summary judgment in Texas).
Using summary judgment as a requirement for fee shifting furthers predictability
and uniformity in enforcement because fee shifting would not then be affected by a
jury's whims or an attorney's skill at voir dire.
286. This proposal is meant to provide a remedy different from Rule 11, so the pre-
vailing party could recover attorney's fees when the claim is dismissed under Rule
12(b) or (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because an involuntary dismiss-
al is a dismissal on the merits, it falls under this proposal. Thus, no distinction exists
between dismissal for procedural or substantive reasons. A party who voluntarily dis-
missed the action, however, would not be liable for the other party's attorney's fees
because voluntary dismissal would have to occur before the motion for summary
judgment. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a).
Even Rule 11 opponents acknowledge the logical link between dismissal on the
merits and fee shifting. Commentators have frequently argued that Rule 11 sanctions
relating to the merits of a claim should apply solely when courts award summary
judgment or grant a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 91, at 268-79
(noting that a case proceeding to trial is some "'measure of its merit" (quoting Rule
11 authority Gregory Joseph)).
287. This proposal also covers partial summary judgments. See, e.g., FED. R. Cirv. P.
54(b). Otherwise, a party could protect himself from fee shifting by attaching a vexa-
tious claim to a minor, meritorious one. Determining the award of attorney's fees
when there has been a partial summary judgment should not be a significant burden
Fairness is further ensured because the prevailing party recovers reason-
able, not actual, attorney's fees." Determining reasonableness is a mat-
ter for the court to decide on an individual basis.' While statutes
might place a cap on the amount recoverable, this would not be an im-
portant qualification since the proposal's narrow scope limits counsel
fees. By restricting this proposal to summary judgment or dismissal, the
to the court, since a basic assumption of this proposal is that there would be a gen-
eral standard of reasonableness for attorney's fees. Under current state or federal
statutes, courts may shift part of the attorney fees when appropriate. See Pennsylva-
nia v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 715 (1987)
("Under the typical fee-shifting statute, attorney's fees are awarded to a prevailing
party and only to the extent that party prevails.").
288. Reasonableness is the standard under Rule 11 and most fee-shifting statutes.
See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 11. In 1991, the President's Council on Competitiveness rec-
ommended limiting the prevailing party's recovery of attorney fees to the amount the
loser must pay his attorney. AGENDA, supra note 17, at 24; see Dan Quayle, Civil
Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L REv. 559, 567 (1992).
289. Federal courts have developed the lodestar method of calculating reasonable
fees. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S.
546, 562-66 (1986) (approving the use of lodestar calculation as reasonable hours
times reasonable rate), rev'd on other grounds, 483 U.S. 711 (1987). Courts may con-
sider the Johnson factors, which may modify the lodestar formula, to determine rea-
sonableness. See id.; Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th
Cir. 1974); Dobbs, supra note 126, at 467-70 (disucssing Supreme Court decisions
concerning the lodestar formula). All factors may not apply to a particular case, and
some may assume a perspective that is not relevant here. Nevertheless, in the ab-
sence of statutory or precedential direction, the Johnson factors provide a useful tool
for courts. In Johnson, the court listed the following factors to consider when deter-
mining attorney fees awarded under federal statute:
(1) The time and labor required .... The trial judge should weigh the hours
claimed against his own knowledge, experience, and expertise of the time re-
quired to complete similar activities. If more than one attorney is involved,
the possibility of duplication of effort along with the proper utilization of
time should be scrutinized. The time of two or three lawyers in a courtroom
or conference when one would do, may obviously be discounted. It is ap-
propriate to distinguish between legal work .... and other work which can
often be accomplished by non-lawyers .... Such non-legal work may com-
mand a lesser rate. Its dollar value is not enhanced just because a lawyer
does it. (2) The novelty and difficulty of the questions. Cases of first impres-
sion generally require more time and effort on the attorney's part .... (3)
The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly . . . . (4) The preclu-
sion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the
case .... (5) The customary fee .... (6) Whether the fee is fixed or con-
tingent .... (7) Time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstanc-
es .... (8) The amount involved and the results obtained .... (9) The
experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys .... (10) The "undesir-
ability" of the case .... (11) The nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client .... (12) Awards in similar cases.
Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19 (emphasis and citations omitted).
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losing party, in effect, does not face a penalty for bringing a colorable
claim.
While the vast majority of state actions are covered by this proposal,
some claims must be excluded from it. The proposal is broader than
most statutes, because it applies to both contract and tort actions. Yet,
for public policy reasons,'s child custody matters and first-party insur-
ance claims might also be exempt from fee shifting. Further, federal
issues, such as civil rights claims, would not be subject to this proposal.
Thus, this fee-shifting statute would not chill civil rights claims. In addi-
tion, this proposal is subject to current legislation that allows one-way
fee shifting."'
Because awarding summary judgment is discretionary, the judge's
discretion is factored into the proposal. The possibility remains that a
court's reluctance to award summary judgment in some cases could
contravene this proposal. Those cases would, most likely, be rare. Al-
though some judges may have an unhealthy commitment to the American
rule, judges have an interest in relieving the current burden on courts. As
the success of the 1983 amendment to Federal Rule 11 shows,' courts
290. Although insurers do not have a fiduciary duty to the insured, the insured
should not have to face penalties for trying to enforce an insurance contract See
Douglas R. Richmond, An Overview of Insurance Bad Faith Law and Litigation, 25
SETON HAu L. REV. 74, 103-17 (1994). In addition, society has a strong interest in the
welfare of children, and thus challenging custody orders may be in the best interest
of children. But see CAL FAM. CODE § 3407(g) (West 1994) (providing that courts
may award attorney fees to the party not commencing the proceeding).
291. One-way fee-shifting statutes may benefit a prevailing plaintiff in certain cases,
such as consumer actions. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee Shift-
ing, 79 VA. L REv. 2039, 2056-57 (1993). There are over 100 federal statutes that
allow for one-way fee shifting in favor of plaintiffs. Id. at 2041-42. These statutes are
designed to allow plaintiffs with limited resources to sue even when the remedy
sought may not involve large damages. Id. at 2088-89 (noting that one-way fee shift-
ing is appropriate when plaintiff successfully seeks injunction). These statutes may
involve civil rights or claims against the government. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993) (involving civil rights); 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)
(awarding counsel fees to prevailing defendant when government brings suit); see also
Claudio Riedi, Comment, To Shift or to Shft: Attorney Fees for Prevailing Claim-
ants in Civil Forfeiture Suits, 47 U. MIAIu L. REv. 147 (1992) (arguing for a fee-
shifting statute for prevailing defendants in drug forfeiture cases). The majority of
state and federal fee-shifting statutes allow recovery of attorney fees solely to a pre-
vailing plaintiff. See Gregory A. Hicks, Statutory Damage Caps Are an Incomplete
Reform: A Proposal for Attorney Fee Shifting in Tort Actions, 49 LA. L. REV. 763,
795 n1l12 (1989); see also Note, Are We Quietly Repealing, supra note 170, at 329-31.
292. See, e.g., Lawyers' Responsibilities to the Courts, supra note 58, at 1635-36
quickly adjust to a new practice. Although making summary judgment
mandatory in particular cases would eliminate the court's discretion'm
and strengthen this proposal, judicial discretion in the disposition of
cases preserves the likelihood that colorable claims will proceed to tri-
al. 4
Variations on current exceptions to the American rule, such as the
common fund exception,2"5 may provide exceptions to fee shifting un-
der this proposal. While the exceptions under the American rule operate
solely in favor of the successful litigant,' possible exceptions under
this proposal favor the loser. For example, if a plaintiff brings an action
with the intent to benefit a particular class but loses the suit, she may
not be solely liable for the other party's attorney fees.' For obvious
reasons,2N courts would very rarely invoke such an exception. Nonethe-
less, exceptions not currently recognized in federal courts might be ap-
propriate under a two-way fee-shifting statute. The private attorney gen-
eral doctrinem could protect claimants motivated by public interest. Ad-
ditionally, the factors delineated in Alaska's Civil Rule 82' ° could pro-
vide guidelines for other exceptions. Overall, this proposal could be a
boon to public interest litigants. Having to pay both sides' counsel fees
may induce solvent individuals and companies to settle legitimate claims.
(claiming that courts and lawyers generally viewed the 1983 version of Rule 11 as
favorable).
293. The President's Council on Competitiveness recommended mandatory summary
judgments. See AGENDA, supra note 17, at 20. Mandatory summary judgments would
be effective, because, "[a]lthough judges should be independent, they must comply
with the law." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 cmt. 1 (1990); see In re
Hague, 315 N.W.2d 524, 532-33 (Mich. 1982) (holding that a judge's repeatedly ignor-
ing legal precedent is grounds for discipline).
294. Justice Thurgood Marshall maintained that a judge's ability to sanction parties
and his ability to manage a case are related. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertain-
ment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 127 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice
Marshall argued that the court's power to sanction under Rule 11 should be broad-
ened to include all culpable parties. Id. at 127-31 (Marshall, J., dissenting). This idea
was incorporated into the new Rule 11. See supra note 41 and accompanying text
295. See supra notes 112-35, 160-63 and accompanying text. As it is antithetical to
the purpose of the proposal here, the bad faith theory would not provide an excep-
tion to this Comment's fee-shifting scheme.
296. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
297. Suits brought by shareholders, trust beneficiaries, and union members are the
obvious examples. See Vargo, supra note 8, at 1579-83 for other possibilities. The key
qualifier for the purpose of this Comment is that there are symbiotic relationships
among the plaintiff, the defendant, and the class.
298. Courts would be loathe to burden a class that has not received a benefit ex-
cept in the most extreme cases. A case that obviously has merit but is dismissed for
obscure procedural reasons might be such a case.
299. See supra note 130.
300. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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Further, the statute recommended here does not significantly impact
indigent litigants, particularly if an exception applies. Select use of ex-
ceptions protects worthy claimants and ensures that justice serves both
parties to a lawsuit.
Government must seek new remedies to meritless litigation, because
current solutions are incomplete or ineffective. Rule 11 is now discretion-
ary, and awarding attorneys' fees may become a rare penalty."' Addi-
tionally, post-1983 versions of the Rule have not allowed sanctions for
good faith efforts to modify current law,' so that the court's discretion
has been a significant factor at some point in all Rule 11 motions.' For
this reason, meritless claims never triggered Rule 11 sanctions in a pre-
dictable fashion,' and Rule 11 in any form has not been a reliable tool.
Certainly, society cannot depend upon it now to deter unmeritorious
claims or to compensate the victims of abusive litigation.
Further, as discussed in previous sections,' other federal measures
do not offset the Rule's deficiencies. The usefulness of § 1927 and the
courts' inherent power are both very limited. Similarly, state common
law and statutory remedies do not discourage meritless claims. Common
law remedies are difficult to prove.' State analogues of Federal Rule
11 are inoperative in federal courts, and many are discretionary. °7 Oth-
er state statutes designed to counter frivolous claims are ineffective ei-
ther because they do not apply to many causes of action or because the
court may chose not to shift fees.' Alaska's statute, which is mandato-
ry and is not restricted to specific types of claims, only partially indemni-
fies a prevailing party.' Clearly, none of the current state or federal
exceptions to the American rule furnish a satisfactory solution to the
problem of abusive litigation.
The proposal offered here benefits society and individuals. It benefits
society because it is efficient. Although efficiency is not the primary
rationale for this proposal, an inefficient court system impairs the admin-
301. See supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
303. See Risinger, supra note 69, at 5; Vairo, supra note 23, at 495; Lawyers' Re-
sponsibilities to the Courts, supra note 58, at 1649-51.
304. See Risinger, supra note 69, at 5; Vairo, supra note 23, at 495; Lawyers' Re-
sponsibilities to the Courts, supra note 58, at 1649-51.
305. See supra notes 93-135 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 137-63 and accompanying text
307. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text
308. See supra notes 169-228 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 181-94 and accompanying text
istration of justice. Managing claims, even to the point of summary judg-
ment or dismissal, is time consuming and detrimental to courts."'
Therefore, courts benefit from discouraging claims that have no substan-
tial justification."' The proposed law is a bright-line test, designed to
facilitate efficiency and to prevent satellite litigation.2 Further, individ-
uals benefit from fee shifting because it is fair. When fee shifting is the
law, people are less likely to be legally harassed, and those who are ha-
rassed are compensated. While some commentators deny the importance
of fairness to victims of meritless suits,"3 logic and intuition suggest
that individuals should be free even from the harassment of an unreason-
able complaint."1 4
310. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 398 (1990) ("Baseless filing
puts the machinery of justice in motion, burdening courts and individuals alike with
needless expense and delay.").
311. Excessive litigation is a social problem because "[r]esources that might be
devoted to more productive uses are wasted on excessive litigation expenditures."
HAzARDET AL, supra note 261, at 441-42. Further, "[i]f the economists are correct,
the only group that benefits from . . . [protracted or excessive litigation] are lawyers
engaged in high-stakes litigation .... " Id. at 442.
312. See supra note 63 and accompanying text; cf. BURBANK, supra note 68, at 98
(claiming that, with a presumptive rule that Rule 11 sanctions will be imposed, satel-
lite litigation would be reduced).
313. See Cooter & Gel, 496 U.S. at 411-12 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting)
("[T]he fact that the filing of a complaint imposes costs on a defendant should be of
no concern to the rulemakers if the complaint does not impose any costs on the
judiciary."); see also Kimberly A. Stott, Comment, Proposed Amendments to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11: New, but Not Necessarily Improved, 21 FL. ST. U. L
REv. 111, 134 n.160 (1993) (asserting that "there is little harm done when a pleading
is filed and withdrawn").
314. This proposal deters the filing of frivolous lawsuits because filing a meritless
complaint with the intent to voluntarily dismiss it before trial would be risky. A vol-
untary dismissal is subject to this proposal if the injured party has already filed a
motion for summary judgment or dismissal.
Further, this proposal may chill a common practice. Some plaintiffs file suit and
then use discovery to try to justify it. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975) (stating that discovery which allows "a plaintiff with a
largely groundless claim to simply take up the time of a number of other people,
with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement val-
ue, rather than a reasonably founded hope that the process will reveal relevant evi-
dence . . . is a social cost rather than a benefit"). But qf Note, Pleading Securities
Fraud Claims with Particularity Under Rule 9(b), 97 HARV. L. REv. 1432, 1440-43
(1984) (claiming that courts should not dismiss cases under Rule 9(b), but should
allow for ample discovery after filing a complaint). While discovery may be needed
to prove factual allegations, lawyers and clients should investigate claims as much as
possible before filing suit. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 875-
76 (5th Cir. 1988); In re Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146
F.R.D. 507, 585 (1993). This proposal will not deter plaintiffs who are certain of their
claims, but it may discourage plaintiffs in search of a cause of action.
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Even when the burden of counsel fees is not great, those who bring
suits in order to force settlement would probably think twice before
doing so under the law suggested here. Innocent defendants will no lon-
ger be forced to weigh the relative losses of settling or proceeding to
trial. Further, when a suit is honest, plaintiffs will not be forced to
abandon claims when attorneys' fees threaten to exceed any recovery.
Therefore, the financial burden would fall completely on the party most
at fault, a litigant who either brings a suit with no chance of success or
one who unreasonably defends a legitimate claim. The prevailing party
would experience true justice-a vindication of his rights and reimburse-
ment for defending them.
VIII. CONCLUSION
An effective program will.., simplify rules and procedures as well as... give
greater access to the poor and middle class. Access without simplification will be
wasteful and expensive; simplification without access will be unjust'
The American rule rewards baseless claims."' For this reason alone,
two-way fee shifting is preferable to the American rule. Yet, the Ameri-
can rule also discourages the litigation of strong, but modest, claims.
Thus, when the law is well-defined and the merits of a case clearly favor
one party, fee shifting is appropriate, predictable, and eminently fair.
Indeed, fee shifting is necessary to do justice if a claim or defense is
procedurally or substantively without merit. While justice requires that
the courts welcome those with meritorious claims, justice also requires
that a responsible party make a wronged party whole. This proposal
compels plaintiffs to recognize an affirmative duty to investigate the like-
lihood of a suit's success before bringing it. Similarly, defendants must
not be able to avoid liability by hiding behind the outdated philosophy of
the court system.
To the extent that this proposal discourages some plaintiffs from chal-
lenging existing law, it may inhibit the growth and modification of the
common law. Yet, every case does not present an opportunity for change
and many lawsuits are brought in bad faith. Clearly, a case such as the
Culbertson winery case that began this article is no MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co."7 or Li v. Yellow Cab."8 Further, it is not likely that the lim-
316. THE LITGATION ExPLoSION, supra note 14, at 44 (quoting Derek C. Bok, Presi-
dent of Harvard University).
316. See Maggs & Weiss, supra note 48, at 1926.
317. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916); see supra notes 265-66 and accompanying text.
318. 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975) (en banc); see supra notes 267-71 and accompanying
ited scope of this proposal and the modest cost to the losing party would
deter serious efforts to change the law. The chilling effects on good faith
claims would be minimal-a "small but necessary price we must pay to
impose a modicum of responsibility on those who litigate."
31 9
The common law grows by small increments, gray areas of the law
clarified with each step, and there are many gray areas in the law that
courts must resolve. It is not in the public interest to repeatedly haul set-
tled legal issues before the judiciary. Neither is it in the public interest to
allow claims with no factual basis to go unsanctioned and victims to
remain uncompensated. In any case, the proposal recommended here
would have a minimal effect on the growth of the common law. While
the judiciary is generally reluctant to overturn precedent,32° the legisla-
ture is sufficiently active and more likely to modify the law."l Even for
modest changes of judicially-created rules, the judicial branch often de-
fers to the legislature.3' Therefore, it is the responsibility of state and
federal legislatures to take meaningful steps to reform the American rule.
Certainly, the foundation of any legal system is equity and justice, and
the American rule too often contravenes these principles.
The solution presented here must work in conjunction with current
statutory and common law remedies. Nonetheless, this proposal should
prove an effective addition to the tools designed to deter frivolous litiga-
tion. Further, the fee-shifting statute suggested here not only provides
full compensation to an injured party in limited, but significant, instanc-
text. An example of a case that would have been impacted by this proposal is Dillon
v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (en banc). As discussed supra, this opinion is con-
troversial and represents a minority position. See supra notes 272-74 and accompany-
ing text.
319. Louis, supra note 85, at 1062 (referring to Rule 11 sanctions).
320. See BURGER, supra note 244, at 67 (reprint of a speech given at Georgetown
Law Center, Sept. 17, 1971). "[Tjhe litigation process is one factor in change, it is a
slow, painful and often clumsy instrument of progress unless one is content to mea-
sure progress in terms of generations and centuries." BURGER, supra note 244, at 67.
321. Compare Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)
(rejecting the private attorney general doctrine as justification for fee shifting) and
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980) (rejecting counsel fees as a sanc-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1927) with 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (allowing
fee shifting in civil rights actions) and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (al-
lowing attorneys' fees as a sanction under this statute). See generally Note, The Inef-
ficient Common Law, 92 YALE L.J. 862, 871-87 (1983) (asserting that, because the
judiciary favors "reckless rules," modern legislatures eclipse the common law with ef-
ficient statutory law).
322. For example, the American rule itself is judicially created. See Arcambel v.
Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796). Nonetheless, the American rule "is entitled
to the respect of the court till it is changed, or modified, by statute." Id.; see also
supra note 8 and accompanying text, When courts have refused to modify the Ameri-
can rule, the legislatures have made modifications. See supra notes 20, 321.
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es, but also encourages positive attitudes toward the American court sys-
tem in general. Without compromising public access to courts, this pro-
posal denies lawyers and irrational litigants the right to sue irresponsibly.
By merging the American and English rules, American courts have the
long-awaited opportunity to dispense unencumbered justice.
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